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Preface
For long-time students of crisis management, COVID-19 is ‘the big
one’—the scary Future Crisis so often announced and discussed in the
literature: truly global, arriving slowly and lasting for a very long time,
with devastating impacts. COVID-19 was the ultimate stress test for plans
and preparations, for political and administrative leadership, for societal
and institutional resilience.
In this book, we wield the tools of crisis studies to understand and
explain the dynamics of governmental and societal responses during the
first twelve months of this crisis. This is not a detailed case study with
timelines and statistics. Our focus is on how governments, particularly
those of the advanced economies (that we are most familiar with) have
responded to the pandemic, to the complex, transboundary multi-crises it
has generated, and the ways publics reacted to the various responses.
To write a book about COVID-19 while it is still unfolding is an
inherently premature endeavour. The pandemic is still with us. The long
shadow it will cast on our societies is only beginning to form. Much
about what has happened behind the scenes of political decision-making
and public sector performance remains unknown. It is therefore inevitable
that some of our findings and interpretations in this book will need to be
nuanced or revised as new information emerges.
Yet, we think it is important to take a good look—‘from the balcony’—
at the governance of this crisis while it is unfolding. Governments and
scholars cannot afford to begin the work of reflecting and learning until
v
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this crisis is truly ‘over’, which may be years from now. Future crises are in
the making. We need to get ready. We need to learn what we can, as soon
as we can. This book is intended to provide fuel for such a discussion.
We offer a synthesis of what we believe to be the four main challenges
that all governments face in a crisis of this magnitude: they must make
sense of a highly uncertain and dynamic threat; get things done in the
face of collective action problems; craft credible narratives about deeply
unsettling events; and work towards closure of a crisis that has the poten-
tial of destabilizing our societies and their political systems. In the final
chapter, we offer some preliminary directions for the deep institutional
learning required to make our communities and our governance systems
more resilient when the next ‘big one’ comes along.
We have made liberal use of the quick-response analyses published
by social science colleagues around the world. Together, they covered
most all dimensions of the responses of governments, political systems
and societies. These scholars have provided a strong evidence base, while
addressing a swathe of crisis management and public governance themes.
We thankfully build on this body of work.
We are particularly thankful to our research assistants, Marte Luesink
and Friso Welten, who have done excellent work (ranging from desk
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CHAPTER 1
The Year of the Unthinkable
Abstract COVID-19 brought the ‘unthinkable’ to our doorstep. The
pandemic caused a series of global, and interconnected, health, economic,
social, institutional and political crises that are unprecedented in living
memory. Political leaders struggled to contain the virus and persuade
anxious, weary citizens to behave this or that way in order to overcome a
giant collective action problem. This chapter is a primer for the detailed
examination of political and policy responses to this impossible challenge.
It describes pivotal governance challenges and the constraints operating
on the crisis response.
Keywords Transboundary crises · Pandemic · COVID-19 · Crisis
politics · Crisis management
Nobody wanted 2020 to be this way—Canadian Prime Minister Justin
Trudeau. (Lum, 2020)
Pandemics and plagues have a way of shifting the course of history,
and not always in a manner immediately evident to the survivors. The
COVID pandemic will be remembered as such a moment in history,
a seminal event whose significance will unfold only in the wake of the
crisis.—Anthropologist Wave Davis (2020)
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Annus Horribilis
The year 2020 will be remembered for the global pandemic—a ‘sem-
inal event’ (Davis, 2020)—that dwarfed all other global crises in living
memory. By the year’s end, COVID-19 had directly caused the deaths
of nearly two million people, jeopardizing the health, well-being and
livelihoods of hundreds of millions more.1 It was also an unwanted
event, as Trudeau said (see opening quote). Pandemic control measures
have pushed economies around the world abruptly into recession while
emptying government coffers at astonishing rates. Global debt incurred
as a result of COVID-19 has been estimated at $10 trillion in 2020, rising
up to $30 trillion by 2023 (Assi et al., 2020).
Statistics alone cannot capture the human toll of the crisis. Families
were separated from loved ones who died alone. One survivor, who had
been hospitalized in the UK for several weeks, said that “I must have seen
at least eight people die…… And the fear in people’s eyes is shocking. ….
It’s like a nightmare with your eyes open” (Murray, 2020). A physician
in New York described how his hospital was “… just getting destroyed.
It’s very, very gruesome…. I have one face shield that I have to keep
rewashing after seeing every patient…It’s pretty common to see [staff]
crying in the hallway… The morale among ER people is extremely low.
People are anxious, making morbid jokes about dying” (Bernstein, 2020).
People suffered in many other ways. They feared that they would lose
their job or the business they had just started. Young people wondered
whether they would ever get a job. Many patients experienced setbacks
in their treatment plans as the hospitals were filled and non-urgent care
was limited or cancelled. Kids got behind in school. People were lonely,
as they could not see their loved ones or go out and make new friends.
The impact of COVID-19 was not equally distributed. The ‘Great
Pestilence’ of our times exposed fragilities in healthcare systems, economic
systems, and the fabric of social and institutional trust (Keane, 2020). The
toll of the coronavirus deepened social fault lines of race, class, age and
place. And, as happens in almost every crisis, COVID-19 also produced
‘winners’—people and businesses that were granted unsuspected oppor-
tunities and made the most of it.
1The coronavirus disease 2010 (COVID-19) is caused by coronavirus SARS-COV-2.
The numbers were found at https://covid19.who.int/.
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COVID-19 will enter the history books as a “mega-crisis’” (Helsloot
et al., 2012). The virus generated fear and suffering. The pandemic
put extraordinary pressures on health systems. The crisis required tough
decisions about the allocation of scarce resources and painful response
measures.
Many political leaders will likely remember COVID-19 as the biggest
crisis they had to manage. New York governor Andrew Cuomo spoke of
‘111 days in hell’ during which he could barely sleep as his state and
in particular New York City reeled from the impact of the pandemic
(Sanchez, 2020). The Italian Prime Minister, Giuseppe Conte, put it this
way: “I feel the pain of the gaping wound that this nation is experi-
encing….Behind the numbers are names and surnames, life stories and
broken families. The Italian nation is suffering” (Lowen, 2020). Canadian
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau conveyed his exasperation: “COVID-19
really sucks… This is really difficult.… It is frustrating to have to go
through this situation. Nobody wanted 2020 to be this way” (Lum,
2020).
We also witnessed amazing successes. Entire nations pulling together
as one, with ‘teams of millions’ displaying remarkable self-discipline and
adaptive capacity (Jetten et al., 2020). Governments following science,
taking the politics out of the response. Governments in East Asia imple-
menting the lessons from earlier experiences (2003’s SARS, 2009’s swine
flu and 2015’s MERS) (Moon, 2020). Countries such as Vietnam and
New Zealand pursuing early and aggressive elimination strategies that left
them nearly virus-free throughout 2020.
Some leaders reaped the political benefits of perceived effectiveness.
Germany’s veteran chancellor Angela Merkel, who was on her way out
of politics before the pandemic began, saw a stunning reversal of her
approval ratings (Armstrong, 2020). New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda
Ardern came within a hair’s breadth of winning an absolute majority in
the October 2020 parliamentary election, a remarkable feat under the
country’s proportional representation voting system.
But the governance of COVID-19 response has also been marred by
conspicuous failures and intense politicization. There was the UK’s initial
and ill-conceived pursuit of a ‘herd immunity’ strategy and the cavalier
attitude of its Prime Minister, Boris Johnson. There were nasty disin-
formation campaigns. There was the deep disenchantment among the
population of France with its government’s heavy-handed response. There
was the unedifying infighting between state administrations and Donald
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Trump’s White House. There were heads of government describing the
virus as a hoax, bathing in crowds, hugging and shaking hands. There was
the deep concern about governments using the crisis to acquire and wield
far-reaching executive powers, the undermining of checks and balances
and violating human rights—trampling principles of good governance.
How does one govern during a lethal pandemic? Governments every-
where faced challenges that we know from dystopian disaster movies
(Bostrom & Ćirković, 2008). In an idealized world, we might expect
existential threats to be met with a mixture of effectiveness, empathy,
legitimacy and de-politicization. We would expect political elites, busi-
ness leaders and citizens working hand in hand, doing what they can to
conquer the virus and allay collective fears. That did not always happen.
Helping us grasp the governance of COVID-19, warts and all, is the
key objective of this book. We seek to capture the mix of challenges
and opportunities that COVID-19 brought to public policymakers and
political actors. We contemplate how leaders, governments and public
institutions navigated this extraordinarily deep and protracted crisis.
Simple questions guide our quest. How have our systems of public gover-
nance performed in the greatest stress test of our times? What lessons do
we really need to learn if our systems are to be resilient enough to cope
with and bounce back from the next mega-crisis?
A Crisis Perspective on Pandemic Governance
The Black Plague of the Middle Ages killed an estimated 40–60% of
the people in Europe, Africa and the Middle East (Green, 2015). Every
century since has produced pandemics of varying scale and severity,
including typhus, cholera, small pox and influenza. In a period of roughly
2 years from early 1918 to late 1919 at the tail end of World War I, a
global pandemic, commonly known as ‘Spanish Flu’ infected roughly half
a billion people (one-third of the world’s population) and killed at least
30 million people (Barry, 2004; Phillips & Killingray, 2003). Many deadly
pandemics have followed since (AIDS, MERS, SARS, H1N1, Ebola).
A community of public health experts, including virologists and
epidemiologists, studies how communities and their leaders should
prepare for such threats. They try to establish which measures should
be taken in which phase of an emerging pandemic. Specialized organi-
zations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the US Centers
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for Disease Control (CDC) and the European Centre for Disease Preven-
tion and Control (ECDC) take stock of research findings and translate
these findings into protocols. Each new pandemic thus poses a test to the
current knowledge of this international community.
Each pandemic also tests the more generic capacity of a community
to deal with an unexpected and major threat to the well-being of that
community and its members. In recent years, the world has seen many
‘mega-crises’ and disasters. Governments everywhere have ramped up
preparation and response structures as they face the prospect of future
crises that dwarf the scope of previous threats.
Researchers from different disciplines seek to understand how govern-
ments, businesses, NGOs and international organizations respond to
such large-scale contingencies. The umbrella term of ‘crisis’ has become
increasingly popular in capturing the special challenges that this class of
events entails (McConnell, 2020). In this book, we conceptualize crises
not in terms of their physical properties such as deaths and damage, but in
terms of how political-administrative elites perceive the events in question.
We speak of a crisis when the governing elites perceive “a serious threat to
the basic or the fundamental values and norms of a social system, which
– under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances – necessitates
making critical decisions” (Rosenthal et al., 1989, p. 9).
A combination of threat, uncertainty and urgency unsettles the
routines of political decision-making, policy implementation and public
service delivery. The perception of threat raises the stakes of governing. It
generates intense media attention and arouses strong public emotions—
an explosive mix for incumbent politicians. When the threat is deemed
not just serious but urgent, politicians and policymakers are robbed of
an important problem-solving mechanism: time. They have no time to
analyse, deliberate, negotiate and procrastinate. High levels of uncertainty
about the precise nature, impact and duration of the perceived threat
make it hard to organize an effective response. Leaders discover to their
dismay that they have to make highly consequential decisions based on
nothing but gut feelings or political judgement.
To manage a crisis under these circumstances, two types of expertise
or ‘craft’ are needed. As a professional craft , crisis management is about
scenario modelling, contingency planning, mobilizing response capacity,
making tough decisions, coordinating the efforts of different agencies
and jurisdictions, moving from response to recovery and ensuring that
the crisis experience is thoroughly investigated and lessons are learned.
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As a political craft, it is about the strategic framing of the nature and
causes of threats, the social distribution of risk and harm across groups
and interests, exploiting opportunities to capture the limelight and shift
policy agendas, claiming credit or navigating blame games and pushing
for, or blocking, systemic reforms.
Wielding a crisis perspective helps us to see that many of the prob-
lems that emerged during the COVID-19 crisis were very similar to the
challenges that typically occur in all sorts of crises. For example, COVID-
19 watchers have often been confounded by the depth of uncertainty,
the dynamics of public perceptions and the ways in which politicians and
other actors ‘talk up’ or ‘talk down’ the scope, origins and severity of the
pandemic. All this is standard fare for crisis analysts (Boin et al., 2009;
Boin & Lodge, 2016; Brändström & Kuipers, 2003; De Vries, 2004;
Drennan et al., 2015).
A crisis perspective also helps us to see the unique characteristics of
COVID-19, which have made the response to this threat such an ordeal.
Let us take a look at these characteristics and contemplate how they made
the response more difficult than public health experts appear to have
imagined beforehand.
The Unique Characteristics of the COVID-19 Crisis
What places the coronavirus pandemic in a class of its own is the
combination of three types of characteristics. COVID-19 qualifies as a
creeping crisis , as the pandemic stretched out over time (Boin et al.,
2020). COVID-19 was a transboundary crisis, crossing geographical,
jurisdictional and sectoral borders (Boin & Rhinard, 2008). It was also
a solidarity crisis—a massive collection action challenge, as the great
majority of people was not directly threatened by the disease but was
asked or compelled to make sacrifices in order to suppress the virus. This
is a rare combination, which creates special types of challenges. Let us
discuss the characteristics and the governance challenges that flow from
them in more detail.
Incubation and Rapid Escalation
There was no a clear beginning (no ‘big bang’), just an increasing stream
of worrying signals. The world watched closely how the Chinese mounted
an all-out response. Many experts dismissed the new coronavirus as yet
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another virus mutation that would probably be nipped in the bud or
would turn out to be not all that dangerous (like H1N1).
But the coronavirus escaped China and spread across the world. On
1 February 2020, there were just over 12,000 cases globally and 259
deaths.2 When the virus manifested itself in one country after another,
many leaders were surprised by the scale of the crisis. The crisis eventually
disappeared, at least for a while, and returned with a vengeance in many
countries (the second and third waves). As we write this, it is still not clear
when and how this crisis will end (see also Chapter 5).
A Solidarity Crisis
COVID-19 was more than ‘just’ a respiratory illness. The disease could
inflict chronic damage on major organs (particularly the heart, kidneys
and lungs) and impair neurological functions to the point of long-term
debilitation and death (Roberts et al., 2020). The elderly, people with
certain underlying health conditions (such as obesity, immune system
deficiencies, diabetes), the socially disadvantaged and people living in
high-density communities ran markedly higher risks of getting seriously
ill or dying from the effects of the virus.
In theory, no one was immune, not even the rich, famous and
powerful: Donald and Melania Trump and Ivana Trump, Boris Johnson,
Prince Charles, Usain Bolt, Tom Hanks, Marianne Faithful, Placido
Domingo, Silvio Berlusconi and Emmanuel Macron contracted the
disease (to name but a few). Most people who got it, did not get sick.
Over time, this well-publicized pattern began to gnaw at the credibility of
the crisis response. Small but vocal groups of ‘dissenting’ medical practi-
tioners, economists and citizens questioned government claims about the
virus and its consequences. Conspiracy theories about the origins of the
virus and the ‘real’ objectives of politicians or business elites—Bill Gates
and George Soros figured prominently—flourished.
The rapidly deepening economic malaise set the stage for an intense
political debate about the trade-off between the health of at-risk groups
and the prosperity and well-being of society. Critics charged that govern-
ments were stupidly persevering with social distancing, lockdowns and
other restrictions that were accomplishing very little (saving the lives of
2Data is from the Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Research Center.
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the very old and infirm, many of whom had limited life expectancies)
at a phenomenal price (extensive damage to the prosperity, well-being
and indeed the health of the other 98% of the population). Perceptions
shifted again when hospitals filled to capacity and ambulances had to wait
for hours to have their patients submitted to the hospital. In hindsight,
the UK’s original impulse towards a ‘herd immunity’ strategy is perceived
by many as a callous sacrifice of vulnerable citizens (Hunter, 2020).
Multiple Domains, Multiple Crises
The pandemic was not confined to a delineated geographical location
(a “Ground Zero”) nor did it fall neatly within the jurisdiction of one
governmental entity. There was no self-evident jurisdictional or sectoral
point of gravity from which response efforts should be organized. Many
actors at all levels of governance and in all corners of society, each with
different sets of concerns, resources and responsibilities assumed a role in
the crisis response. This created considerable discussion and sometimes
tensions about who is ‘in charge’ and of what exactly. The pandemic
severely tested the capacity of existing systems of intergovernmental rela-
tions—particularly in federal systems of government and in multilevel
polities like the European Union—to mount coherent responses and
prevent politically damaging blame games.
Moreover, the pandemic produced more than a health crisis. It gave
rise to a complex and multifaceted intersection of numerous crises. We
give a few examples:
An economic crisis. The economic challenges of COVID make the global
financial crisis that began in 2008 look tame by comparison. The miti-
gation measures had dire economic consequences: massive job losses,
reduced investment, downsizing and bankruptcies, declining tax revenues.
Massive stimulus measures and rapidly escalating social spending created
enormous budgetary shortfalls. Debt levels soared. Economically precar-
ious sectors such as the arts, high-street retailers, hospitality, farming and
public transportation faced unprecedented conditions in terms of reduced
demand and/or reduced income. In the tourist sector alone, roughly 305
million jobs were at stake (International Labour Organisation, 2020).
A social crisis. The pandemic exacerbated pre-existing inequalities in most
if not all societies (Blundell et al., 2020). For example, Black people in
the US were 2.5 times more likely to die from the virus than white people
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(Kaur, 2020). In Spain, the impact of lockdown measures had a harsher
effect on low-paid, lower-educated workers, with women being particu-
larly affected because of large increases in childcare and housework (Farre
et al., 2020). Around the world, large numbers of schoolchildren from
underprivileged backgrounds suffered the consequences of protracted
school closures. Containment measures had a negative effect on domestic
violence, child poverty and alcohol abuse. Mental health experts issued
dire warnings about the long-term impacts of the crisis on people with
pre-existing mental health conditions.
A political crisis. In any crisis, core values in a system are at stake. They
may become endangered and violated. They are defended, fought over,
reconfirmed or traded-off against one other. In the process, previously
taken-for-granted political commitments and the coalitions supporting
them may be shattered. The cross-cutting impacts of the pandemic
forced critical choices on virtually every country, every organization,
every community, every family and each person. COVID-19 threatened
to splinter societies, increase ethnic conflicts, and fuel radicalization and
undermine trust in science and expertise (Woods et al., 2020). The
COVID-19 crisis was deeply political and unleashed a series of challenges
for politicians, policymakers and public institutions.
Many doubted whether governments were up to the task of managing
this multi-crisis. A recurrent criticism was directed at the apparent refusal
of political leaders to listen to scientific experts. There was the related
charge that governments were listening to a far too narrow set of
experts—i.e. epidemiologists, but not economists or social scientists.
Another complaint held that leaders were captured by an experts-driven
technocratic mode of policymaking and downplayed legitimate considera-
tions beyond the realm of scientific expertise. The structures and processes
of government were criticized as too slow, too opaque, complacent and
starved of resources (Gaskell et al., 2020; Pargoo, 2020; Ruiu, 2020).
The performance of public institutions became subject of critical
discussion. Were the incentives and resources of healthcare systems
properly set up to absorb the onslaught of COVID patients? Did crit-
ical information reach the right organizations and the highest levels
of government? Were organizations able to cast aside their standard
operating procedures and effectively improvise? Were governments able
to overcome the usual institutional pathologies—organizational silos,
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bureaucratic politics, intergovernmental stalemates and blame shifting—
that make it so difficult to tackle complex problems? Were the institutional
guardians of democracy and the rule of law robust enough to provide the
required checks and balances on executive power?
Judgments about institutional performance varied widely. In countries
like South Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan and New Zealand, the sense of unity
of purpose and collective achievement in eradicating the virus was strong.
The COVID experience triggered a celebration of institutions. In other
countries, there was overt institutional strife, sometimes producing policy
stalemate and political standoffs. Critics of the status quo had plenty of
arguments to advocate for reform.
There was also a human rights (or libertarian) dimension: governments
were accused of exploiting the crisis to pass draconic emergency laws
giving them even more powers than they already possessed.
Resulting Challenges
One consequence of these unique characteristics was that the crisis
remained hard to grasp. The root causes of a crisis that originated in
another country or sector are difficult to comprehend. Causes are unclear,
possible consequences seem uncertain, and escalation is unpredictable.
Not just in the initial stages of the pandemic, but months into it, COVID-
19 kept throwing up questions that could not be answered. In that
sense, it remained what it was from the outset: a rude surprise, in which
not-knowing was chronic rather than ephemeral.
Epidemiological research worldwide has been operating at a frenetic
pace since February 2020, but by the year’s end much remained unknown
about the exact behaviour of the coronavirus. Research and data gath-
ering faced many complications, including the absence of testing (in
cases of those who asymptomatic or have only mild symptoms), the vari-
ability of testing regimes, contextual variations in community beliefs and
behaviours, and differences in policy settings and response capacity of
health systems.3 Exacerbating the uncertainty was the time lag that can
3One key uncertainty is the infectiousness of the virus. The basic reproduction number
(Ro) is an indicator of transmission. Whereas the Ro for influenza is stable and predictable,
coronavirus reproduction numbers were hard to measure and appeared to vary markedly
in both time and place (Linka et al., 2020).
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occur between the point of infection and the onset symptoms, which can
vary from a few days to two weeks.
A second consequence was the difficulty of formulating working strate-
gies. For most policy issues, possible solutions exist. They may be contro-
versial or taken for granted. A pandemic defies easy solutions. What works
here may not work there. COVID-19 caused multiple problems: not one
but many strains of the virus; different health impacts across different
demographics; seasonal and other geo-spatial factors mitigating its trans-
mission; low SES groups and regions much harder hit than affluent
ones; a complex mix of direct (health) and indirect (secondary health,
psychosocial, socio-economic, supply-chain, political, even geopolitical)
impacts.
Policymakers faced numerous urgent issues they had to decide on:
testing, protective masks, medical equipment, contact tracing, stay-at-
home orders, restrictions on gatherings from funerals to sporting events,
mask wearing, curfews, shutting down of parts of the economy, the care
system, the education system, income support and business continuity
packages. No ready-made solutions existed. Navigating these challenges
required improvisation. Responses were always provisional, had significant
unintended consequences and were open to contestation.
How Did It Go? First Impressions
We expect our governments to ‘rise to the occasion’ when a crisis rears
its head. We expect crisis leaders and crisis systems to rapidly shift into
crisis mode, drawing on contingency plans and extensive preparation. We
expect the ‘public interest’ to prevail: political leaders and the systems
they preside over should put aside party politics, career ambitions and
bureaucratic politics. They should be decisive, explain their strategy and
demonstrate empathy and compassion.
Ever since World War II, a broad array of crises and disasters has
punctuated the progress of affluent and stable Western societies. The
COVID-19 crisis has put the resilience of these societies and their
governments to their sternest test yet. Although it is far too early to
pass definitive judgement on government performance in the face of
COVID-19, a few stage-setting observations can be made at this point
in time.
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Our Systems Were Not Designed for Pandemics
Political systems, public institutions and policy processes were clearly not
built to deal with a serious pandemic. In fact, these systems are not built
to deal with mega-crises. The systems were developed incrementally over
time to deliver public sector services such as health, education and welfare
in an effective, efficient and legitimate way. That proves hard enough
on a daily basis. Contingency plans, risk management planning and crisis
response systems were ‘add-ons’. Designing capacities to deal with plau-
sible worst-case scenarios has never been core business of most governing
systems.
Systems Were Stretched to Breaking Point
The COVID-19 crisis frequently outstripped public sector capacities. In
many countries, hospitals and healthcare systems were close to collapse.
Governments struggled with testing and tracing, enforcing lockdowns
and devising emergency relief measures. Quite a few governmental
systems were unable to produce a coherent strategy or a coordinated
approach to solving critical problems.
Controversy About Response Strategies
Many countries devised policies that proved wanting. The timing and the
scope of lockdown measures proved controversial: draconian measures
but also easing restrictions followed by second waves. ‘Following the
science’ was the mantra for many governments, which led some soci-
eties down surprising and controversial paths. Governments had to
contend with protests and resistance from virus deniers, anti-maskers,
conspiracy theorists and libertarians opposed to ‘Big Brother’ lockdowns
and imposed restrictions.
Success Stories
It was not all doom and gloom. Some governments introduced effec-
tive measures (e.g. New Zealand and China). Some otherwise disjointed
and chronically contentious federal polities managed to produce remark-
ably well-coordinated responses (Germany, Canada, Australia). Some
government leaders turned into highly astute interpreters of scientific
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issues (Merkel in Germany, Tsai Ing-Wen in Taiwan) whereas powerful
displays of empathy characterized the crisis performances of others (such
as Jacinda Ardern in New Zealand and Sanna Marin in Finland). Many
public sectors proved quite adroit in adapting to the crisis landscape,
which was all the more remarkable because of the millions of public
officials working from home.
Government agencies devised and rolled out economic aid
programmes at astonishing speed and to great positive effect. Leaders
abandoned their electoral platforms and ideological proclivities to do
what was deemed necessary. Governments managed to effectively harness
enormous bursts of bottom-up community initiatives. Supply chains held
(the shelves did not go empty). Businesses rapidly adapted their operating
models. Levels of trust in government (and in ‘science’) soared in many
countries and often remained high despite setbacks, controversies and,
sometimes, open admissions of failures of pre-crisis preparedness and
early-period responses.
A Preview of the Book
COVID-19 was a complex multi-system crisis that challenged the political
foundations of modern states. We examine these challenges in detail in
the rest of this book, employing a crisis management perspective. Each
chapter focuses on a particular crisis task (Boin et al., 2016).
Chapter 2 analyses how leaders and public authorities made sense of
the emerging global pandemic. We explore the classic tension between
what in retrospect always appear to be obvious threats and the ‘why
didn’t they seem it coming?’ narrative that typically dominates when the
first signs of the crisis appear. In this chapter, we study how leaders and
experts made sense of the reported cases in Wuhan, how they assessed the
building threat and how the relation between experts and crisis leaders
shaped the initial response.
Chapter 3 examines governmental responses to the crisis. We describe
the challenges of transboundary crisis management. We explain why polit-
ical leaders must juggle multiple pressures, which emanate from different
types of crisis (particularly health and economic), and how they seek to
contain and control threats over which they have limited control.
Chapter 4 addresses crisis communication during the pandemic. In
times of crisis, authorities have to weave and communicate believable
narratives about what is going on, what is at stake, what government is
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doing in response, what people can do to keep themselves and others safe.
We discuss how leaders do this in the context of ‘framing contests’—they
are, after all, not the only ones who try to get their message across.
Chapter 5 discusses the politics of closure. It is a salient issue in the
COVID-19 crisis, which may drag on for years. The desire to declare that
it is over after cases and deaths have subsided is understandable, certainly
when the economy is struggling and citizens are suffering from the fatigue
of COVID restrictions. But that desire needs to be balanced with the real-
istic possibility of new waves. This chapter outlines the many challenges
that political leaders have to negotiate on their way to the exit.
Chapter 6 addresses the big question of ‘what next?’ We focus on
the struggle between the impulses of preservation, consolidation and
returning to ‘normal’, but also the impulses for reform, forging new
policies and alliances that would not have been possible without the
norm-shattering impact of the COVID-19 crisis. We provide ideas to
move countries down the road that leads to societal resilience.
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Abstract For a crisis to be effectively governed, it must first be noticed,
interpreted, understood and assessed. This chapter explores how policy-
makers ‘made sense’ of the emerging COVID-19 pandemic. We focus on:
(1) how policymakers around the world detected the developing threat as
it emerged first in China and then in Italy; (2) the prominent involve-
ment of scientific expertise in government sense-making processes (and
in narratives about those processes). We discuss the complex dynamics
between experts, decision-makers and publics that ensued.
Keywords COVID-19 · Sense-making · Uncertainty · Experts ·
Incubation period · Blind spots
The spectre of an unknown virus arising in China gave certain public-
health officials nightmares, but it wasn’t on the agenda of most American
policymakers. (Wright, 2021, p. 4)
We had to make 100% of the decisions with 50% of the knowledge—Dutch
Prime Minister Mark Rutte (Boin, Overdijk, et al., 2020, p. 42, translation)
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A Sense-Making Nightmare
Pandemics belong to the category of ‘known unknowns’ (pace Donald
Rumsfeld): low-probability, high-impact contingencies that risk managers
the world over have had in their sights for a long time but, as Wright
correctly noted above, did not emerge immediately on policymaking
agendas (Garrett, 1994; National Intelligence Council, 2000). In the
decades leading up to COVID-19, experts warned that the next pandemic
was overdue; diseases such as SARS and Ebola were widely viewed as
harbingers of things to come (e.g. Baekkeskov, 2017; Baekkeskov &
Rubin, 2017; Nohrstedt & Baekkeskov, 2018; Olsson & Xue, 2011). Yet,
in many countries, the signals of the COVID-19 crisis were somehow
missed or did not lead to decisive action.
For a crisis to be effectively managed, it must first be noticed, inter-
preted, understood and assessed. We call this sense-making. Crisis analysts
set great store in the Thomas theorem, which holds that ‘if men define
their situations as real, they are real in their consequences’ (cf. Rosenthal
et al., 1989; Thomas & Thomas, 1928). If not enough people—or not
enough powerful people—sense risk, sense threat, sense significant values
and interests being at stake, the system will not respond; or it responds in,
what later turns out to have been, a too-little, too-late fashion. Likewise, if
enough powerful people get all worked up about a relatively minor threat
that looms large in their belief systems, the system will respond even
as outside observers or subject matter experts deem that response too
much or premature. In other words, systems may respond to emerging
threats in timely and proportionate fashion, but they may also underreact
or overreact (Maor, 2018).
The dynamics of sense-making are at the heart of shaping those
responses (Janis, 1989; Jervis, 1976; Lebow, 2020; Vertzberger, 1990).
Sense-making refers to the social and cognitive processes of registering
and analysing cues, signals and data about an impending threat and
imbuing this information with meaning. Cognitively, this happens in
the brains of individuals. But it is also and perhaps foremost a social
process. When interpreting signals, individuals take into account beliefs,
norms and expectations from others and the social groups they belong to
(Douglas, 1986). They talk to each other about what they see and what
they think it means. This ‘collective sense-making’ provides the vital link
between threats materializing in the world ‘out there’ and the nature and
timing of a system’s responses to those threats (Weick, 1995).
2 WHAT’S GOING ON? 21
The importance of sense-making as a precursor to action does not stop
when a crisis is recognized and called. Sense-making remains critically
important throughout the lifecycle of the crisis, directing policymakers’
attention to selected cues, propelling them towards some but not other
interpretations of how the crisis is developing, guiding them towards
some but not other courses of action.
This is particularly true in crises where events keep shifting in turbulent
fashion and uncertainty about crucial parameters of the crisis continues
to prevail. Experts may not have the answers one would expect them to
have. Different players in the system may espouse different interpretations
of the events. People may believe (and spread) rumours and falsehoods
while ignoring the ‘real facts’ of the matter.
In such crises, policymakers are not just wrestling with the gravity of
the threat and the enormity of the stakes involved; they are coping with
pervasive uncertainty. They must govern in a state of sustained ignorance:
they do not know what exactly is going on, what will happen next, what
the drivers of the events are, how others in the system are experiencing
and coping with the crisis, what the impact will be of the options laid out
before them.
The COVID-19 crisis ticked all the boxes that policymakers dread:
a potentially enormous but hard to ascertain multi-threat; high levels
of scientific uncertainty about the behaviour of the virus and its health
impacts; high spatial and social mobility of the threat agent; various muta-
tions of the virus; lack of readily available technical fixes and lack of clarity
when they become available and what exactly they can do; increasing
volatility in the public mood and the public’s willingness to keep ‘doing
the right thing’ as the crisis persisted.
The list of uncertainties and ambiguities did not get any shorter during
the COVID-19 crisis. As the pandemic evolved into a multi-faceted crisis,
the state of ignorance deepened with regard to the social, psycholog-
ical, economic and political implications of virus response regimes. The
COVID-19 crisis has been a sense-making nightmare for leaders. The
Dutch prime minister expressed his exasperation well when he noted that
he had to make ‘100% of the decisions with 50% of the information’
(Boin, Overdijk, et al., 2020, p. 42).
So how did leaders fare when it comes to this sense-making challenge?
Many leaders were informed about the new virus but found it hard to
act. They only began to act when hospitals were suddenly and quickly
filling up, prompting a sense of crisis. This pattern repeated itself in many
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countries when the ‘second wave’—widely discussed during the inter-
lude between waves—did, in fact, materialize. We also see a few outliers:
governments who grasped the enormity of the challenge and acted imme-
diately (see, for instance, Taiwan, South Korea, New Zealand, Israel and
Singapore).
In this chapter, we explore how policymakers ‘made sense’ of the
emerging COVID-19 pandemic. We focus on two phases of the crisis:
(1) how policymakers around the world detected the developing threat
as it started to emerge first in China and then in Italy; (2) the prominent
involvement of scientific expertise in government sense-making processes
(and in narratives about those processes). We consider if these factors can
explain the differences in sense-making that have been widely observed.
Detecting COVID-19: Common Challenges
In most countries, except China and Italy, the pandemic did not hit as
an acute, ‘big-bang’ type of crisis. It took weeks, in some cases months,
for the coronavirus to migrate from China to infect a substantial number
of people in Europe. It meandered across national borders, eventually
encroaching on every territory in the world. Media reported widely on
the coronavirus, the lockdowns in China, the arrival of the virus on
other continents. Its pace of development did perhaps not quite resemble
the inch-by-inch dynamic of a “creeping crisis” (Boin, Ekengren, et al.,
2020), but it provided experts and decision-makers with plenty of time
to learn about the threat and appreciate its potential impact (Table 2.1).
Some countries, as noted, reacted quickly. At the end of January,
the German Health Minister, Jens Spahn, still compared the coron-
avirus to the flu. By mid-February, he warned the Bundestag that a
global pandemic could not be ruled out (Deutscher Bundestag, 2020,
p. 18084). Another two weeks later, Spahn declared that the epidemic
had arrived in Germany and ordered the regional governments of the
Länder to activate their pandemic plans (Gensing, 2020).
Some countries did not react at all (Nicaragua, Belarus) or not in a
coherent way (the US, Brazil). Some countries—the UK comes to mind—
made major U-turns in their response policy as unfolding realities belied
the beliefs and assumptions that had guided their initial actions, or lack
thereof (cf. Hale et al., 2020). In most countries, however, initial denial
and downplaying were followed by a sudden recognition that the crisis
was not only real but had actually arrived (see Table 2.2, and Boin,
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Table 2.1 Warning signals of the impending pandemic
31 December 2019 The China Country Office informs the World Health
Organization (WHO) about a cluster of unknown pneumonia
cases
7 January 2020 Chinese experts announce that the virus is a new coronavirus
11 January 2020 The first corona death is reported in China
13 January 2020 The first corona case is reported outside of China (in Thailand)
20 January 2020 Chinese experts confirm that the new coronavirus is transmitted
human-to-human
23 January 2020 The city of Wuhan is in lockdown
24 January 2020 First corona case reported in Europe (in France)
30 January 2020 WHO declares the new coronavirus a public health threat of
international concern.
4 February 2020 China reveals a new hospital with 1000 beds which was built in
less than 2 weeks, while the country is receiving personal
protective equipment from European countries. China’s
healthcare system is under extreme pressure because of the rapid
increase in new coronavirus cases
7 February 2020 The WHO warns of a global shortage of personal protective
equipment (PPE)
15 February 2020 First corona death in Europe (in France)
21 February 2020 A rapid rise of corona cases in northern Italy
2 March 2020 The European Centre of Disease Prevention and Control
(ECDC) updates its risk assessment from “moderate” to “high”
for the general population of Europe
12 March 2020 The ECDC states that the virus can no longer be contained and
social distancing measures should be implemented as soon as
possible
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Overdijk, et al., 2020; Rubin & De Vries, 2020 for case-study accounts
of this pattern in the Netherlands and Denmark). In crisis language, we
saw a long incubation period with a sudden punctuation.
This brings us to the chief sense-making puzzle of the early stage of the
crisis: why did it take so long for countries to realize what was coming?
And why did some countries start to acknowledge the threat much earlier
(a week is a long time in an escalating pandemic) than others?
To answer this question, we must discuss two challenges. First, there is
the challenge of signal recognition. Policymakers are confronted, almost
on a daily basis, with a barrage of information signalling that something
might be afoot. There are many slowly developing and potentially relevant
threats “out there”. Many of these signals are ambiguous and, we find
out later, incorrect. Policymakers must somehow recognize the “correct”
signal—the one they need to act on. Second, it is one thing to register that
something bad might happen, but appropriate action is unlikely to follow
if policymakers do not also correctly assess the signals. They must make
the correct inferences about the nature, scope and escalation potential of
the problems the system is facing.
Why Crises Are Easy to Miss
Crisis research into the incubation periods of multiple crises shows that
both these sense-making challenges—recognition and assessment—are
easy to fail, giving rise to what in retrospect appear to be glaring fail-
ures of foresight (Hindmoor & McConnell, 2013; Parker & Stern, 2002,
2005; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). A number of social science insights help
to explain why this is the case.
Complexity theorists, for instance, explain that many threats do not
behave in linear fashion (Buchanan, 2000; Scheffer, 2009; Taylor, 2001).
Crises incubate, develop and escalate towards a tipping point, after which
the threat rapidly escalates, possibly exponentially so. These tipping points
are hard to predict, sometimes even hard to recognize in ‘real time’. This
is certainly true for COVID-19: the initial number of infections may have
seemed and continued to appear low for some time, but there was always
the potential for them to start rising exponentially (as the world learned
from explanations about the non-linearity of viral infection rates, captured
in the much-discussed ‘R0-value’).
Perrow (1984) offers a supplementary explanation. He noted that
when highly complex systems display a high level of interdependence
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between their component parts, the ripple effects of a small incident or
error may be both large and travel very quickly across the system. Just as
a technological glitch may trigger a chain of events stretching from one
complex system to another, a person who is infected with a communi-
cable disease may quickly spread the virus by entering hubs in a travel
system. This causes what we refer to as a transboundary crisis, which is
marked by cross-boundary escalation of a threat (Ansell et al., 2010; Boin
& Rhinard, 2008). A tsunami can spill over into a nuclear accident. An
electricity failure in one country can lead to a gas shortage in another
country. All within a matter of hours or days. As we have learned from
the SARS crisis, a virus originating in China may rapidly paralyse a city in
Canada (Olsson & Xue, 2011). COVID-19 paralysed much of the world
within months of its first outbreak in Wuhan.
Organizational factors play a big role in the sense-making process.
In complex organizations and networks, information does not flow effi-
ciently (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). How organizations are structured,
what information-sharing routines they have evolved, what beliefs are
ingrained and which are considered heretical, what ‘turf’ is fought
over in the space between organizations—all these factors drive institu-
tional threat perceptions. They help to explain why ‘the dots were not
connected’ (Kam, 1988; Parker & Stern, 2002, 2005; Wilensky, 2015).
Institutional biases and organized blind spots in collective risk percep-
tion also play a role (Bach & Wegrich, 2019; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982;
Freudenberg, 2001; Seibel, 2021). Researchers have noted that many
“warning signals that, with the benefit of hindsight now seem obvious,
were actually ambiguous and fragmented because they were received and
interpreted within a very different ideational environment” (Hindmoor
& McConnell, 2013, p. 543). Research on man-made disasters highlights
the importance of distraction: political attention going to what in retro-
spect prove to be ‘decoy phenomena’ (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). For
example, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson was in the vortex of the Brexit
crisis when COVID-19 emerged. In the Netherlands, the focus was on
two winter storms.
But surely some signals are impossible to miss? It turns out that there
are plenty of psychological factors that explain why people fail to recog-
nize impending, and seemingly obvious, signals of danger (Kahneman,
2013). These have to do with the inconceivability of certain events: some
threats simply escape the imaginary capacity of policymakers and citizens
alike (De Smet et al., 2012). If you can’t imagine a threat (because you
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have never experienced it), you may not recognize it. Hurricane Katrina
provides an example (Boin et al., 2019). Policymakers had known of
the theoretical risk that a hurricane might break through the levees that
protected New Orleans from the surrounding water. But they had never
imagined it. When it actually happened, the surprise was complete.
Inaction in the face of signs of trouble is not just a product of inad-
vertence (McConnell & ‘t Hart, 2019). Political factors matter as well.
What we chose to see (and, by implication, not to see) is shaped by what
we value, who we identify ourselves with, what we fear, who we loathe,
what values and goals we prioritize, what we feel is in our interest to
focus on and what we feel we can afford to discount. How public poli-
cymakers think about risks, threats and crises is political at heart—and so
we should be attuned to the politics of sense-making through which their
thoughts are formed, bolstered, questioned, adjusted and abandoned (cf.
Schatschneider, 1960).
Some policymakers may choose to ignore information about an
impending threat. They may think that there is no solution. They may
not like the solution or find it politically infeasible. They may think that
the solution is worse than the cure. They may fear that the public will
not want to make sacrifices needed to counter the threat. They may be
convinced that the public will panic if they learn more about the threat.
They may want to keep the issue small until after the upcoming election.
Political considerations and preferences can and do sometimes muffle loud
and clear warning signals.
The leaders of the US, Russia, Mexico and Brazil were all informed
about the virus and its potential consequences, but went to great lengths
to talk down its importance. As late as March 3, UK Prime Minister Boris
Johnson told the public that “for the overwhelming majority of people
who contract the virus, this will be a mild disease from which they will
speedily and fully recover” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2020a). In mock-
Churchillian fashion, Johnson encouraged the country to “take it on the
chin”—before succumbing to the virus himself and come close to death
just weeks later (Cottle, 2020). These leaders chose to keep seeing the
world as they liked it to be rather than for what it actually had become—
which, as Machiavelli cautioned, is a costly error to make for a ruler.
Especially when combined, these research findings can help to explain
why so many government leaders in Europe and the Americas (much less
so in South-East Asia) assumed things were under control throughout the
months of January, February and even into early March 2020. Yet, these
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accounts leave us with a lingering question: as this was not a ‘unknown
unknown’ but rather a known risk coming true, moving slowly and well
documented, how come leaders were not warned in time and properly
advised to act? Did the experts really miss the crisis they had been studying
and expecting throughout their distinguished careers?
The Role of Experts
The relation between experts and decision-makers is complex, ambiguous
and sometimes tense even in the best of times (Cairney, 2016, 2020;
Parkhurst, 2020). Experts cover multiple disciplines, often disagree and
use different methodologies and interpretations. Their evidence can seem
partial and contradictory. They couch their warnings in technical terms.
They offer predictions in vague, probabilistic statements. Moreover,
experts are often proven wrong in their predictions and threat assessments
(Tetlock, 2017).
When acting in an official capacity (in a governmental body for
instance), they can act more like advisors than scientists. Even when they
have a good hunch about the nature of the developing threat, they may
still be careful to announce their opinion too soon. They know that
“calling a crisis” is an inherently political act (Spector, 2020), with serious
organizational, psychological, economic and social implications. They may
want to avoid being branded a Cassandra, and therefore factor in reputa-
tional and tactical considerations in choosing when and how to appraise
the policymakers of the critical signals that they have begun to detect.
Experts played leading roles in the COVID-19 crisis, to a much larger
extent than customary in ‘normal’ crisis situations (e.g. Sager & Mavrot,
2020). They enjoyed this access primarily because their professional exper-
tise was seen as absolutely essential to make sense of core questions that
governments were facing when formulating responses to the pandemic.
In many countries, chief scientists became well-known public figures,
attracting praise but also severe criticism. Elite scientists—virologists,
epidemiologists, medical specialists but also economic and behavioural
experts—were brought right into the heart of government decision-
making. Some became ‘super-advisers’ whose inputs counted more for
policymakers than those of other scientific experts or more regular pubic
service and political advisers.
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For instance, Sweden’s chief epidemiologist, Anders Tegnell, became
an unlikely folk hero during the early stages of the pandemic. His low-
key, matter-of-fact demeanour helped the Swedes to make sense of what
was happening to them, as did his confident defence of the Swedish
government’s policy to rely mostly (though never exclusively) on social
distancing and voluntarily working from home. The great majority of
Swedes felt that Tegnell sensed correctly what made them tick in a crisis—
being given the freedom to act responsibly—and rewarded him with their
trust.
In New Zealand, Dr Ashley Bloomfield, Director General of Health
and head of the National Health Coordination Centre, became a house-
hold name to New Zealanders. He conducted the daily briefings in which
he ‘made sense’ of the evolving pandemic situation. He threw his weight
behind one of the most forbidding lockdown regimes in the world. His
measured, consistent and slightly nerdy performances turned him into
one of the most revered public servants in the nation (Cameron, 2020).
In the words of one columnist, “Ashley Bloomfield, like the Tiger King,
is now memetic. As I write, Ashley Bloomfield is the number one trend
on Twitter. Ashley Bloomfield has gone coronaviral” (Rawhiti-Connell,
2020).
Many scientists became famous, but were they effective? Two obser-
vations stand out with regard to the role of scientific experts in the
management of COVID-19.
First, experts did not collectively miss or ignore the threat of COVID-
19. The Dutch case provides an example. In January 2020, acting on the
rapidly accumulating information about the new coronavirus in China,
Dutch health officials dutifully placed COVID-19 on the list of A-diseases
(which contains diseases like smallpox, SARS and Ebola). The coronavirus
had not been detected in the Netherlands at that point in time. Following
protocol, doctors were put on notice to notify authorities as soon as they
identified patients who might carry the disease. In many other countries,
experts took this same first critical step in pandemic management.
Second, experts operated within the confines of “received wisdom
based on how previous respiratory viruses behaved” (Dr. Jacob Lemieux,
in an interview with Wright, 2021, p. 21). Much is known about the coro-
navirus. This particular coronavirus, however, behaved differently. Wright
(2021) explains how the experts were misled: “The new pathogen was a
coronavirus, and as such it was thought to be only modestly contagious,
like its cousin the SARS virus. This assumption was wrong. The virus
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in Wuhan turned out to be far more infectious, and it spread largely by
asymptomatic transmission” (p. 2).
This is also the first point in time where countries began to diverge in
their responses. In countries with vivid institutional and cultural memory
of previous pandemics (countries such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singa-
pore and South Korea), the recognition of the possibility of an A-disease
emerging within their borders generated acute threat perceptions and
prompted swift, far-reaching response measures (closing the borders, initi-
ating mass testing, contact-tracing, imposing lockdowns) (An & Tang,
2020). In some countries without direct experience, key experts and insti-
tutions engaged in rapid learning from the unfolding pandemic in China
to inform their sense-making (e.g. Petridou et al., 2020, on Cyprus). In
hindsight, we can say that the decision-making process in these countries
worked as it should.
Most countries were slower in their reaction, awaiting evidence for
the virus to manifest itself within their borders. This disconnect between
knowing and acting originated with the same experts that had placed the
new coronavirus on the A-list. It is almost as if they could not believe that
this was the pandemic that they had been warning against for years (cf.
Garrett, 1994). After the 9/11 attacks, the official inquiry described the
failure of terrorism experts to see this attack coming as a “failure of imag-
ination”. In the case of COVID-19, it appears that many experts failed
to imagine that this pandemic could happen in their country and could
cause many deaths among their fellow citizens. Dr. Fauci told Americans
in a radio interview that the new virus was not something they “should
be worried or frightened by” (Wright, 2021, p. 5). Another US expert,
Dr. Link, recalls: “We thought we’d get one or two cases, just like Ebola”
(Wright, 2021, p. 25).
The Dutch example, mirrored by many other European countries, is
again informative. Experts of the Outbreak Management Team, the offi-
cial advisory group of the Dutch government, repeatedly downplayed the
severity of the virus (“like a flu”), the chances of propagation among the
general public and the chances that the virus would reach the Nether-
lands (Boin, Overdijk et al., 2020). The public was encouraged to carry
on with their lives, which they did. Even when the first cases emerged in
Germany, just a few miles from the Dutch border, Dutch experts saw no
reason to advocate for any sort of intervention (such as limiting or termi-
nating carnival festivities and professional soccer matches). They did not
change their stance until nervous doctors began to call in from one area
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of the country advising that hospitals were being besieged with COVID
patients. It was the first week of March when the government scien-
tists slowly became aware that, in typically Dutch parlance, “the water
had started to run over their shoes” (Boin, Overdijk et al., 2020). Yet,
even then they were hesitant to call for social distancing beyond personal
hygiene and refraining from personal contact (no handshaking).
In the UK, the expert advisory group called SAGE started convening
regularly at the end of January. The group monitored the situation,
provided updates to government officials and wrote advice on which
actions to take, or not to take. From January 31 onwards, the risk level
was assessed as “moderate”. On March 12, the risk level was changed to
‘high’, moving the country from the contain phase to the delay phase;
new cases would no longer be tracked and tests would only take place in
hospitals (Grey & MacAskill, 2020). The minutes of the March 13 SAGE
meeting record that “things are worse than we thought” (Sample et al.,
2020).
In Sweden, state epidemiologist Anders Tegnell assured the Swedish
public that the virus was less dangerous than SARS and MERS (Nordevik,
2020). The Public Health Agency (FoHM) asserted that a large outbreak
was unlikely because the virus would have to be very contagious which
“does not seem to be the case with this virus” (Folkhälsomyndigheten,
2020a). The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that everything
was under control (Von Hall, 2020). Tegnell later apologized that he had
not adequately grasped the severity of the virus. He admitted that more
could have been done to reduce mass casualties among the vulnerable
elderly (Lindeberg, 2020).
Fantasy Plans
In those early February days, experts in many developed countries reas-
sured the public that if the virus should reach their country, health
professionals would deal with it. In the words of CDC director Redfield:
“We are prepared for this” (Wright, 2021, p. 4). Looking back in
December, one of the Dutch experts, intensive care specialist Diederik
Gommers, explained that “we were too optimistic in the early phase of
the crisis. Again and again, I intervened just a week too late” (Weeda,
2020, p. 45). A strong belief in existing national and WHO prepara-
tions for a pandemic appears to have influenced the initial COVID-threat
assessment.
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There were plans and the experts assured policymakers that the plans
were good. Experts could (and did) point to previous virus outbreaks—
SARS, Ebola, H1N1 and MERS—that had been controlled and whose
impacts had been well contained.
The Dutch provide yet another instructive example. The formal desig-
nation of COVID-19 as an A-disease provided the Dutch Minister of
Health with extended powers to impose measures on individuals and
society. The minister showed no interest to use his extended powers.
Indeed, Dutch policymakers and the Outbreak Management Team
experts repeatedly touted the ‘excellent’ preparations of the public health
system. The Dutch had successfully dealt with other diseases (such as the
Mexican flu), which was taken as evidence that the plans had been proven
to work. The implication was clear: even if the coronavirus would arrive,
public health professionals would deal with the threat (Boin, Overdijk
et al., 2020).
In the UK, the uniform message from both political officials and
experts was that the UK was well prepared in case the virus would reach
the island (Department of Health and Social Care, 2020). In his first
public statement about COVID-19, late February, UK Prime Minister
Boris Johnson stated that the National Health Service is “a fantastic
system” and “is making every possible preparation” (BBC, 2020). In
Sweden, all branches of the government and the expert agencies were
confident in their ability to face the challenges the new coronavirus could
pose. When more than three weeks went by between the first and the
second corona case in Sweden, state epidemiologist Tegnell claimed that
“this shows that our current strategy works” (Folkhälsomyndigheten,
2020b). In Germany, Health Minister Jens Spahn professed confidence in
the German healthcare system, which, unlike other countries, had indeed
plenty of testing capacity (Deutscher Bundestag, 2020).
On February 13, 2020, the first emergency meeting of EU health
ministers took place. “Andrea Ammon, the ECDC director, told them
that Europe had adequate lab capacity and that the EU’s containment
strategy was working. The real problem, they heard from the WHO’s
emergencies chief, Mike Ryan, was Africa, which just had two labs
for the entire continent — with a population three times bigger than
Europe’s” (Herszenhorn & Wheaton, 2020). On 25 February, “Ric-
ciardi, the adviser to the Italian government, who was present at the
meeting, said that with some exceptions, including Germany and France,
he had the strong sense that, at least initially, the others thought ‘the
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problem was Italy, you know — not the virus’”. The EU members did
not seem to think the virus was the problem, but Italy’s way of governing
(Herszenhorn & Wheaton, 2020).
We now know that these pandemic plans were more like ‘fantasy docu-
ments’ (Clarke, 1999); they did not suffice in the light of the crisis
scenario that was unfolding. Many national and subnational pandemic
plans were dated, sometimes up to a decade old and not regularly exer-
cised or revised. Some plans focused on diseases that had not reached their
country or on diseases dating back a century (Spanish Flu) (Capano et al.,
2020). European and North American governments “had no or only out-
dated relevant past experiences with such pandemics. They were confident
in their capacity but lack the competences, including in decision-making,
required to do so effective. This made the reaction of most of these
countries slow and uncertain” (Capano et al., 2020).
The real problem was that the experts did not understand the virus and
thus did not understand that their plans would not suffice. The pandemic
playbook in place implicitly assumed that understanding the crisis would
be the least of the government’s problems. The prescribed protocols were
based on the assumption that there is a ‘patient zero’ who can, in prin-
ciple, be identified and found. If health authorities are properly prepared,
they will identify the carrier of the virus and all those who have been in
touch with the carrier (this is the often discussed ‘track and trace’ task
of health authorities). The cognitive backstop in this paradigm is that
a carrier of the virus who is not found in time will sooner than later
succumb to the disease and, in the optimistic scenario, present him or
herself to a doctor. Hollywood movies closely follow this script.
COVID-19 dismantled the paradigm and the plans it had spawned.
Many carriers turned out to be asymptomatic and many patients had only
mild symptoms, which resembled the common flu. In other words, the
biggest pandemic of recent times came disguised and sailed passed the
initial defences set up by pandemic planners. By the time that health
authorities began to understand the virus, it had spread widely. Robert
Redfield, the director of the US Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion, explains: “The whole idea that you were going to diagnose cases
based on symptoms, isolate them, and contact-trace around them was
not going to work. You’re going to be missing fifty percent of the cases.
We didn’t appreciate that until late February” (Wright, 2021, p. 2). It did
not help that most countries had limited tested capacity.
2 WHAT’S GOING ON? 33
When experts eventually did understand that the new virus was the
proverbial black-swan anomaly shaking the foundations of their paradigm,
they acted. A report by a research group of the Imperial College London,
published on March 16, jolted politicians across Europe and the US. The
research group had modelled the effects of the various approaches that the
government considered. The researchers warned that without a correc-
tion of the laissez faire approach then in place, hundreds of thousands
would die from COVID-19 in the UK alone (Ferguson et al., 2020;
Prime Minister’s Office, 2020b). That same day, Prime Minister Boris
Johnson announced the first social distancing measures for the UK. Other
countries had already begun to act, based on expert readings of the draft
report.
We can ask why some leaders acted late. We can also ask why some
leaders acted proactively and, as we now know, in time. Both questions,
in most cases, receive the same answer: because the experts told them so.
We can only hypothesize why experts, operating on the same scientific
knowledge base, offered different advice. Two possible explanations jump
out. First, in countries where previous pandemics such as SARS had not
been controlled, experts had learned how fast a virus could sweep across
the community. Second, in countries where health care was clearly not
excellent or even available to most people, experts could not believe in a
plan that was based on that notion.
Navigating Uncertainty: Science-Policy
Interface at Knife’s Edge
Most governments thus entered the COVID-19 crisis with a very limited
view of the spread of the virus in their territory. Moreover, little was
known about the disease trajectory, who was particularly vulnerable, and
how the disease was best treated. Many political leaders announced their
adherence to a science-led policy and publicly identified (and praised) the
experts on whom they relied (Cairney & Wellstead, 2020). This made
sense, as these experts were selected for precisely this purpose (it would
be weird, to say the least, if governments had not relied on them). The
cloud of uncertainty lifted very slowly, as scientists and doctors raced to
investigate and share their findings (Capano et al., 2020; McConnell,
2020).
Time and again, the virus outpaced the advice of the experts. It
remained hard to assess the scope and severity of the constantly evolving
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threat. The scientists based their advice on evidence, which was inherently
limited in the mist of the crisis. Policymakers began to lose faith in the
advice of the experts before the crisis had fully begun (Cairney & Well-
stead, 2020). It did not take long for politicians to veer away from expert
advice when they realized that the experts had underestimated the spread
and lethality of the virus (Rubin & De Vries, 2020). Evidence-based
sense-making was deprioritized, at least temporary. Leaders emphasized
the importance of trying anything—proven or not—to save lives. In the
first days of March 2020, the Danish prime minister operated:
in a sense-making frame where major decisions needed to be made
fast to avoid an impending disaster, and where scientific evidence alone
could not be trusted to reach the right policy conclusions. The leading
health authority experts, on the other hand, appeared to be in a frame
where evidence-based decision-making was still the modus operandum, and
where policy recommendations were continuously updated as new scientific
information became available. (Rubin & De Vries, 2020, p. 3)
Government leaders sometimes opted for harder measures (e.g. school
closures) than their experts advised, following high-profile interest groups
(e.g. teachers unions, medical bodies) that made their voices heard. In
some countries, non-government virologists publicly urged the govern-
ment to aim higher, go harder and ignore the advice of the official
scientists. For example, New Zealand’s shift from flattening the curve
towards eradication of the virus was prompted by such ‘outside-in’ advice
from two university virologists (Wilson, 2020).
Media increasingly scrutinized the relation between scientists and
decision-makers. Decision-makers had to explain why they did not heed
expert advice; experts had to explain how they could have been so wrong
about this or that. But despite their patchy record in the lead-up to the
pandemic, government experts remained pivotal players throughout the
response phase. Around the world, heads of government and cabinet
ministers tirelessly repeated that their choices were ‘guided by the
experts’.
Politicians continued to rely on experts because the uncertainties
just kept coming. In most crises, uncertainty gradually gives way to an
informed picture of the situation. In this particular crisis, uncertainty
deepened over time. This characteristic alone made the COVID-19 crisis
almost impossible to manage. While more became gradually known about
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the virus and its impact, uncertainty deepened with regard to the impact
of government measures. How long could businesses and industries cope
with the sudden downfall of their markets? What was happening behind
the doors of vulnerable households? What would be the effect of school
closures on the learning trajectories of children? When these issues were
gradually resolved (from a scientific point of view at least), new problems
emerged: virus mutations and vaccine logistics.
Emerging uncertainties increasingly pertained to the behaviour of the
public, businesses and the financial markets. This created a demand for
insights from the ‘soft’ social sciences (e.g. political science, psychology,
sociology). As policymakers soon discovered, academics from these disci-
plines can be notoriously divided. Their expertise is grouped in, filtered
through and strutted by ideologically coloured perspectives. These char-
acteristics bring out the best of the social sciences, but they also limit their
sense-making relevance during crises (Gonzalez Hernando et al., 2018).
Social scientists simply cannot claim that most of their advice is evidence
based (because it is not). Their advice is typically based on good practices
from another place or another time. To be sure, this can be good advice.
But it is rarely backed up by hard evidence.
Different types of insights had to be traded-off against one another. As
a result, a very diffuse, complex and dynamic relation between experts and
decision-makers emerged. It initiated a vicious cycle: as more and more
(types of) advice created apparent inconsistencies and thus new forms of
uncertainty, policymakers felt a need for additional research. This cost
time and, in some cases, had a paralysing effect on decision-makers. It is
a familiar predicament in crisis management: the call for more informa-
tion is met with a deluge of data, confounding rather than clarifying the
situation.
In most countries, politicians made the critical decisions—with or
without evidence-based advice.1 So why would they repeat the mantra
that they were ‘following the science’ when they clearly were not?
This brings us to the politics of sense-making. Their scientific authority
made experts not just leading sense-makers but also tools of policy legit-
imation. For all but the most brazenly corona-sceptic policymakers, who
1A clear exception is found in Sweden. In accordance with its governance model, chief
epidemiologist Tegnell did not just offer advice to policymakers, he actually decided on
key aspects of the government’s response strategy (Petridou et al., 2020; Pierre, 2020).
We could thus say that Sweden gave us the purest example of a science-led response.
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preferred getting into noisy public spats with their chief health officers,
publicly demonstrating their deference to experts was a political no-
brainer. Should any far-reaching decision (close or not close the schools?)
eventually turn out to have negative effects, having the fingerprints of
principal science advisers all over them might also prove useful to diffuse
and deflect blame.
As in recent other viral outbreaks (Baekkeskov, 2016; Baekkeskov &
Rubin, 2014), few leaders resisted the lure of the strategy. It worked well:
When hard decisions with great social and economic costs had to be justi-
fied. When sapping public morale had to be boosted. When the public
needed to be disappointed and persuaded to accept restrictions on their
freedoms just a while longer or yet again. When citizens needed to be
motivated to have needles stuck into their arms. While successful, the
potential for backlash was always there as we will see in Chapter 5.
The Precarious Politics of Sense-Making
Recognizing signals of an impending crisis is not an easy task. Looking
back, however, the COVID-19 pandemic does not appear to have been
the most difficult type of scenario to recognize and grasp when it
emerged. Yet, many experts, policymakers and politicians were surprised
by the escalating speed of propagation and slow to realize the imminent
threat to the lives of vulnerable citizens and otherwise healthy economies.
In some countries, of course, experts did warn and politicians did
act. In these countries, it may have been more acceptable to act on
hunches and instincts that were not yet fully ‘evidence based’. In most
(Western) countries, however, it is not. Other interests have to be taken
into account. Procedures of ‘sound science’ have to be observed. Prudent,
balanced assessment is key.
During the incubation period of the crisis and extending into its
response phase, the nexus between the “diagnostic domain” (inhabited
by experts) and the “action domain” (inhabited by policymakers) proved
more complex and less perfect than the public glorification of experts
seemed to suggest (Boin & Lodge, 2019). The experts did not “miss”
the impending crisis, but their interventions apparently did not manage
to forge a political mindset that took seriously the ‘bad case scenario’
which was unfolding, and to adopt it as the basis for their decision-making
(McConnell & ‘t Hart, 2019; see further Chapter 3).
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Intriguingly, and posing a prime puzzle for future research, this pattern
appears to have largely repeated itself when ‘second waves’ of the virus
began to emerge during (northern) Summer and early Autumn. Just when
people were celebrating their newly restored freedoms and all the policy
talk was about engineering recovery, the virus data started to point the
other way, in some cases as early as late July. This harsh reality proved hard
to accept, even in hitherto successful polities like Germany. Politicians and
experts in many countries did not grasp that it was happening again. They
did not display the vigilance one would have expected after having been
caught out during the early months of the year.
In ‘normal’ crises, the distinctions between the diagnostic and action
domains are clearly drawn and closely guarded. In the context of creeping,
protracted, up-and-down-and-up-again crises such as COVID-19, these
distinctions become blurred—both a sense of urgency and the discipline
of patience are important assets to have but trigger very different types of
mindsets and policy propensities.
This provides us with an important lesson: the political appreciation of
warning signals is informed by the challenge of timing. Acting too late is
obviously costly, but acting too soon may generate accusations of the tail
wagging the dog. In the COVID-19 crisis, it has proven difficult to get
the balance right.
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Abstract This chapter reviews the main governance challenges policy-
makers faced during the COVID-19 crisis. It examines how governments
mobilized institutional capacity to tackle these challenges. We focus
on attempts to centralize crisis decision-making and discuss whether
centralization contributed to government effectiveness and legitimacy.
Keywords COVID-19 · Crisis decision-making · Centralization ·
Effectiveness · Legitimacy
When the Rule Book No Longer Works
The virus tested the capacity of nations and societies to deal with a
cascading threat that had no precedent in the post-war era. When the
potential impact of COVID-19 came into view, governments faced the
critical challenge of protecting the health of their citizens, the viability of
businesses and industries, and the functioning of critical infrastructures
against the onslaught of the pandemic.
A pandemic can only be quickly brought under control by bringing
collective behaviour under control. The alternative—waiting for a vaccine
to arrive or the virus to infect a majority of people—is both costly and
politically risky. The policy options for controlling collective behaviour
are limited: a government can try to persuade its citizens and businesses
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to adhere to social distancing guidelines (the path taken by Sweden)
or force them to do so through some type of lockdown regime (the
preferred option in most countries). Persuading businesses and citizens
to make jarring sacrifices presupposes that governments can draw on
reserves of political trust (Cairney & Wellstead, 2020); forcing them to
do so requires the willingness of leaders to use force, which may cause
the reservoir of trust to erode.
These options can be designed and implemented in many different
ways, and the pandemic regimes that emerged in those first months
of 2020 varied accordingly. We can group the pandemic regimes along
several dimensions: the number of social distancing measures (working
from home, closing down public events, limiting travel, closure of restau-
rants, bars and schools), the sanctions imposed, the ways of enforcement,
the level of compensatory funding (for COVID-19 response patterns, see
Bouckaert et al., 2020; Cheng, Barceló, et al, 2020).
In choosing between these options and designing an optimal policy
mix, leaders had to balance imperatives of public, economic and social
health (Dostal, 2020; Polischuk & Fay, 2020; Rauhaus et al., 2020).
Lacking evidence-based insights (as we have seen in the previous chapter),
leaders had to make ‘tragic choices’ (Calabresi & Bobbitt, 1979): what-
ever they decided, there would be losers. In making such choices,
government leaders typically apply political filters (Maor et al., 2020):
how does the issue look and feel to (different groups of) ordinary citizens?
How will the policies recommended by the experts play with stakeholders?
Are these proposed measures politically acceptable, in the coalition, in
parliament, to the party base? Can we afford what is being proposed here?
Do we have the capability to implement it?
Whatever choices they made, there were no plans readily available to
translate them into coherent policy regimes. Even though most countries
had some sort of pandemic preparation in place, they soon discovered
that the core assumptions underwriting their plans and procedures, as
collected and disseminated by the World Health Organization (WHO),
were of limited use. The WHO prescribed hygiene measures, physical
distancing, isolation of patients, tracking and tracing of contacts—but did
not provide templates for the closing down of society (or parts of it).
Governments across the world had to improvise their responses (Capano,
2020; Turrini et al., 2020).
As we write this, experts are studying the effects of these responses.
They explore correlations between infection and mortality rates, and
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a host of social, institutional, historical and political factors (varying
from female vs. male heads of government to individual vs. collectivistic
cultures, from climate effects to the political affiliation of leaders). This
will go on for years, and it is simply impossible at this point in time
to meaningfully evaluate and explain the effectiveness of all the response
policies that emerged across the world (Bromfield & McConnell, 2020).1
We will need much more data and modelling to establish whether the
schools should have been closed or not, whether it made sense to limit
travel, whether facemasks really made a difference, whether complete and
long-lasting lockdowns were worth the price, and whether the powers
appropriated and wielded by governments were proportionate. In fact,
even when looking through the rear-view mirror at COVID-19, we may
never arrive at a consensus, as the assessment of what was effective and
legitimate, and whether that was worth the price, involves normative
judgements and contestable counterfactuals.
What we can do now, however, is characterize the response chal-
lenges and interpret the crisis response efforts of Western governments
during the first phase of the epidemic. From a bird’s eye perspective, two
remarkable characteristics of the responses stand out.
First, in spite of the variability in response policies across countries,
most governments managed to bring the first wave under control. Hence,
collective behaviour—the key to controlling a pandemic—may well have
been shaped by a fear-driven collective willingness of people to act in a
way that benefits the society of which they consider themselves members
(cf. Johnson, 2020) rather than by the mix of policy instruments deployed
by various governments. This should not come as a surprise: decades
of research in disaster sociology and social psychology have consistently
shown that people tend to act in altruistic, pro-social ways when faced
with acute exogenous threats to their common values, interests and
identities (Drury, 2018; Zaki, 2020).
1There are many online, ongoing monitoring efforts that are of great value in tracking
and assessing response efforts and their economic, social, democratic and human rights
consequences. These include the Blavatnik School of Governance Coronavirus Govern-
ment Response tracker, the ACAPS COVID-19 Government Measures Dataset, Freedom
House’s Democracy Under Lockdown project, the Pandemic Backsliding Project and
IDEA’s Global Monitor of COVID-19’s impact on Democracy and Human Rights, as
well as thematic COVID-19 response monitors run by the European enter for Disease
Control, the IMF and the OECD.
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We can also observe that many countries struggled to bring the second
wave under control. Harnessing discipline proved more difficult the
second time around. An often-heard lament during the second wave was
that many people were simply tired of social distancing measures and no
longer behaved in the spirit of solidarity with those at risk of the virus.
That, too, is in line with crisis research findings, which note that the
altruism of the early response phase tends to break down over time as
social and political fault lines re-emerge, government measures are shown
to be ineffective or controversial, and ‘rally-around-the-flag’ effects wear
off (Herrera et al., 2020).
Let us now dig in a little deeper. What problems were governments
confronted with, how did they respond, how did they set themselves up
for dealing with such an extraordinary set of challenges in a manner that
was to be both effective and legitimate?
Governance Challenges
The COVID-19 crisis immediately confirmed received wisdom among
crisis researchers: contingency plans rarely survive contact with the enemy
(Clarke, 1999). It is fair to say that the pandemic is one of the few
crises that many if not most countries had prepared for, in one way or
another. After all, the ‘next pandemic’ has traditionally featured on every
list of likely future crises (Garrett, 1994). Modern societies have experi-
enced just a few deadly pandemics (AIDS, SARS, Mexican Flu) since the
Spanish Flu. These were brought under control and provided input for
the updating of plans and procedures, as well as the creation of new insti-
tutions such as the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control
(ECDC).
It is understandable that politicians, policymakers and experts in
Western countries laboured under the impression that their systems were
well prepared to deal with the new coronavirus. Their surprise that these
plans were no match for the pandemic is, then, equally understandable.
Surprise or not, decisions had to be made. Vulnerable populations were
at serious risk if the virus was allowed to spread (An & Tang, 2020;
Migone, 2020). Hospital systems could be overwhelmed, crowding out
regular care (which, in turn, would put other groups at risk). But any sort
of measure imposed to stop the spread of the virus would require sacrifices
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from other people who would be unlikely to suffer any health conse-
quences even when infected by the virus. Governments faced a complex
set of immediate decisions to be made:
Influencing collective behaviour. How to induce public behaviour so as
to reduce community transmission of the virus? What mix of persuasion
and compulsion was deemed both effective and legitimate? When to apply
lockdowns, in what form, and for how long? What place was accorded to
testing and contact tracing in that mix, and how to increase that capacity?
Tragic choices in health and care systems. To what extent should govern-
ment leaders step into guide life-and-death decisions in hospitals, general
practices, nursing homes, aged care facilities and shelters with regard to
(1) distribution of IC-beds/ventilators; (2) selection of eligible patients
for life-saving treatment; and (3) deployment of critical staff in cure and
care? But also: what vaccine options to invest in? How to prioritize who
should receive the vaccines?
Managing scarcity. Governments everywhere were soon confronted with
shortages that had to be resolved. But how to navigate the international
supply-chain race to ensure continued supply of medical and other critical
resources in a world that had mostly shut down? Purchasing and distri-
bution of protective equipment and medicines required decisions about
where to buy and at what price.
Managing economic upheaval. Designing, coordinating, delivering and
maintaining support for mega-stimulus packages and crisis-induced
monetary and tax measures is not an easy task (as the experiences during
the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 taught us). Political leaders had
to decide how much money to spend and what to spend it on. How to
dodge the known risks of delayed impact, market distortions and fraud?
How to apply economic policy instruments in a way that does not throw
good public money at businesses that are not going to survive? How to
build in incentives for businesses to come off the government’s tap as
quickly as possible when conditions ease?
Addressing secondary impacts. In the face of urgent problems needing
immediate attention, policymakers quickly discovered that they would
have to devote their attention, political capital and operational resources
across many (and the number kept increasing) ‘theatres of war’. The
prime focus of most governments was initially on the acute public health
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and socio-economic challenges. New challenges continued to emerge
as many countries faced second and third waves: spikes in homeless-
ness, loneliness, depression, family violence, alcohol and substance abuse;
school children and students struggling to keep up or going AWOL.
Mitigating inequality. As it became increasingly clear that negative
impacts were not equally distributed across the community—COVID-19
was hitting disadvantaged groups a lot harder, as always happens during a
pandemic (Rosenberg, 1992)—government leaders had to decide if and
how they would mitigate this inequality of impact.
Steering towards restoration or reform. Even in the midst of crisis, govern-
ments had to contemplate a post-vaccination future. Should their society
“return to normal” or aim for change and innovation in health systems,
in how work gets organized spatially and temporally, in business and
leisure travel? Should they re-appreciate the caring professions, the social
sector, the value of community? Should they try and exploit the COVID-
19 experience to achieve policy objectives in other domains, such as
improving air quality, enhancing sustainability and meeting the Paris
climate change mitigation objectives?
How leaders and governments responded to these challenges would
affect not just the course of the pandemic and its many societal impacts
but also the public perception of the crisis response: whether citizens
thought the COVID-19 crisis was handled with poise, decency and intel-
ligence, or haphazardly, indifferently and opportunistically, generating
pubic disappointment, resentment and anger. In other words, it would
enhance or deplete the political capital that leaders brought to the crisis.
First Responses
The immediate responses varied markedly across (and sometimes within)
countries. They can be roughly organized into three types: the lock-
down, the light regime and the absent regime. In practice, many countries
adopted some sort of mixture of these regime types and many govern-
ments adapted their regimes over time. But most responses can be sorted
this way, which allows us to contemplate why governments would adopt
this or that type as their starting point in formulating a response.
China provided a first template by imposing a complete and unprece-
dented lockdown. The world looked on with a mixture of awe and
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scepticism. Critics observed that such a response was only possible in an
autocratically ruled society in which mass surveillance was already widely
employed. But their experience with viral outbreaks and pandemics such
as SARS and Avian flu likely provided a role as well: the attitude towards
pandemic risk, the availability of critical resources and the public’s will-
ingness to comply with ‘go early, go hard, keep going as long as it
takes’—paraphrasing New Zealand’s Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern—
all help to explain why this draconian approach was adopted in China
(Jamieson, 2020; Johnson, 2020).
When the virus arrived in Italy, the government adopted a hard lock-
down (Capano, 2020), initially only in the northern regions. As the
pandemic spread, variety in response regimes soon emerged. Many Asian
countries, for instance, shied away from lockdowns, instead adopting a
combination of frequent and massive testing, complemented with exten-
sive track and trace policies, the cancelling of public events and the
universal wearing of facemasks. At the other end of the spectrum, the US
President Trump did not deem it necessary to impose social distancing
measures (though many individual states did). Sweden stuck close to
the regime that was originally proposed by the World Health Organi-
zation (but did not follow it when the WHO adapted its guidelines).
The Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria and Germany followed versions of
a more flexible approach, imposing a rump set of restrictive measures,
which were tightened as circumstances required (Boin et al., 2020;
Desson et al., 2020).
The nature and levels of government support for businesses and
citizens varied as well across countries (Park & Maher, 2020). Some
countries were proactive in providing generous business continuity and
wage stability packages. Many countries, of course, had limited means to
offer such support. In the US, the design and funding of such support
schemes became object of an intense political fight between Democrats
and Republicans in Congress.
Many businesses, especially those in the leisure and travel industry,
suffered terribly from the imposed social distancing measures, while
others were largely unaffected or made a killing. Governments were
besieged by lobbyists, arguing for government support or waivers from
social distancing measures. Governmental decisions prompted classic
questions: why did they throw billions at national airlines or big mall
owners, while ignoring the dire needs of higher education (as in
Australia), restaurants, museums and small business owners?
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Scarcity was dealt with in different ways. In some countries, the limited
availability of IC-beds and IC-personnel could mean that patients without
insurance or financial means would not be treated in an IC-unit. Other
countries drew up priority listings, selecting on age and underlying condi-
tions. Similar choices had to be made when it turned out that testing
capacity was limited. In some countries, demand was limited by speci-
fying the symptoms that were most likely to indicate that someone was a
carrier of the virus (this created a skewed picture of the infection rate). In
addition, certain groups were prioritized (hospital workers, teachers) or
de-prioritized (the elderly). Other countries managed to avoid this type
of dilemma altogether, as they had procured plenty of testing capacity
(Germany, Korea).
The structural shortage of personal protective equipment (PPE) in
hospitals and nursing homes created policy dilemmas, but also indi-
vidual dilemmas for caretakers. In the early phase of the crisis, many
doctors and nurses—including those working in ‘rich’ countries—had to
decide whether they would work without protective gear. In hospitals and
nursing homes, wrenching decisions had to be made: who would receive
the few available face masks? At the policy level, the allocation of scarce,
life-saving material played out in different ways: hospitals vs. nursing
homes, heavy-hit areas vs. areas ‘in waiting’—but also giving into price
gauging vs. waiting until trusted suppliers could deliver again (Vecchi
et al., 2020). Particularly notable was the way in which the American
president politicized the allocation of ventilators, threatening to punish
states with Democratic governors that did not “treat him well” (Wright,
2021; Young et al., 2020, p. 484).
The Politics of Crisis Response
COVID-19 demonstrated that many governments had come to rely on
the market for the provision of critical goods (PPE), supply chains (food)
and critical infrastructures (ICT). But it also showed that many private
sector companies relied on the public sector for bailouts, regeneration
strategies, enabling business activity through emergency trading regula-
tions. The rapid development of vaccines exemplifies this mutual relation:
‘big pharma’ needed huge infusions of public funds to rapidly produce a
vaccine and quick regulatory approval to bring it to market. A return to
normalcy any time soon would be impossible without vaccines.
3 GETTING THINGS DONE 51
Another observation with regard to the way governments negoti-
ated these tough dilemmas was the weakness of existing mechanisms
of international coordination and cooperation (Dostal, 2020). When
the pandemic came, national governments were primarily focused on
producing a national response. Countries did not coordinate border
restrictions (in federal countries, states/provinces did not, or barely, coor-
dinate their internal border closures, e.g. Benton, 2020; Bennett, 2021).
This led to awkward situations that arguably helped to spread the virus
(e.g. when Belgium closed its restaurants, people simply drove across
the border to patronize Dutch restaurants). The same thing happened
when countries began to relax measures (Austria and Switzerland opening
their ski venues, while Germany, France and Italy were calling upon their
citizens to forego ski vacations).
COVID-19 was a prime example of what we call a transboundary crisis:
an acute threat that spills over national, institutional and cultural borders.
Transboundary crises test governance systems that are built on the idea of
such borders (Boin, 2019). The COVID-19 crisis exposed the weakness
of international governance systems when it comes to managing trans-
boundary crises (Blondin & Boin, 2020). Rather than seeking to use
existing coordination and information-sharing mechanisms, most states
resorted to a form of ‘crisis management autarky’. When Italy called for
help, member states did not reply. When the new EU budget was drawn
up, the richer member states initially refused to allocate funds for the
hard-stricken southern states. This undermined the sense of solidarity that
supposedly would lead to assistance of member states in times of dire
need.
Harold Lasswell’s (1936) articulation of politics as a question—Who
gets what, when and how?—is writ large in the COVID-19 crisis. The
politics of managing this crisis centred around the distribution of the
consequences of crisis decisions. But the crisis also opened windows of
opportunity for the distributors of scarce resources. Powerful industries—
think of airlines and tourism sector—suddenly were at the mercy of
governments for life-saving bailouts. This provided government leaders
with leverage to demand long-sought-after reforms. Other leaders simply
used their distributive power for political gain. Prime Minister Boris
Johnson used the approval of a vaccine—the first approval in Europe—as
evidence for the promised Brexit benefits.
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COVID-19 presented the EU with a unique opportunity to reinvent
itself as a transboundary crisis manager. A range of fairly recent trans-
boundary crises (the Ash cloud, the financial crisis, the immigration crisis,
the threat of cyber breakdowns, climate change) had enhanced the realiza-
tion that these threats demand some sort of transboundary response. The
European Union (EU) had begun to build transboundary crisis manage-
ment capacities (Boin et al., 2013; Wolff & Ladi, 2020). While the EU
had limited formal competences in the area of public health, it had created
systems for early warning and information sharing that were designed to
further a joint response to an emerging pandemic. But they were not used
in this crisis.
The member states resolved to strengthen the EU’s crisis management
capacities, agreeing on new competencies to manage public health emer-
gencies (Brooks & Geyer, 2020). Moreover, in what was “possibly the
biggest advance in integration since the Euro”, the member states agreed
to a 750 billion solidarity fund (Rachman, 2020, p. 17). The money was
to be raised by issuing common EU debt. Some heralded this as a critical
juncture in EU economic policy and as an instance of crisis-induced EU
institutional learning (which the EU had not recognized in response to
the Eurozone crisis) (Ladi & Tsarouhas, 2020; Schmidt, 2020; Wolff &
Ladi, 2020).
Governance Capacity and Legitimacy
Establishing a pandemic response regime that effectively reaches across
society and is embraced by the broadest possible spectrum of community
actors requires not just immense effort and commitment of resources.
It rests upon two critical preconditions: the capacity to govern effec-
tively (Dror, 1986, 2001) and the social legitimacy afforded to the effort
(Carter & May, 2020). This is, as political scientists and public adminis-
tration scholars have long known, true for all government efforts aimed
at steering collective behaviour (Lodge & Wegrich, 2014; Pressman &
Wildavsky, 1973). It is particularly true in times of crisis (Christensen
et al., 2016).
3 GETTING THINGS DONE 53
Boosting Governance Capacity
Governance capacity is generally measured in terms of task fulfilment:
can a government leverage its legal, financial, informational and logis-
tical systems to design, coordinate and deliver interventions that ‘work’
(Boin & ‘t Hart, 2012; Carter & May, 2020; Lodge & Wegrich, 2014)?
Crises challenge existing governance regimes and test the efficacy of new
capacity mobilized by governments. Crises also challenge the strength of
the social contract that informs and constrains the exercise of state power.
That’s why governments usually find it hard to ‘deliver’ in times of crisis.
During COVID-19, governance capacity was needed to:
• Address shortages in PPE, ventilators and hospital staffing;
• Enforce rules with regard to quarantines and social distancing;
• Allocate funds to support citizens and businesses in need;
• Ramp-up testing;
• Devise strategies to help at-risk groups and those with complex
needs;
• Roll out nationwide, high-speed vaccination campaigns (and get
large proportions of the population to participate in them).
These challenges proved problematic in many countries.
In times of crisis, governance capacity cannot suddenly and quickly
be enlarged or enhanced without hiccups and unintended consequences
(Capano et al., 2020). It is possible, however, to streamline the gover-
nance of existing capacity. This is typically done by centralizing authority
and augmenting executive power.
Most countries have mechanisms to centralize state power in the hands
of selected officials if a crisis so requires. The idea has always been that
effectiveness sometimes must be enhanced even if it is at the expense of
democratic oversight. Selected officials are then empowered to make crit-
ical decisions without having to first submit them to democratic bodies.
They are granted constitutional political authority, preponderance in poli-
cymaking, access to resources and the legal authority to steer networks of
institutions and actors.
The Romans had a name for these officials: they were called dictators.
For a carefully delineated period of time (usually a year), one or two dicta-
tors (working in tandem) would rule the republic with absolute powers.
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The early history of the Roman Empire offers examples of absolute effec-
tiveness, but also of the dangers that the mechanism of crisis centralization
brings with it.
It is often assumed in the literature, if only implicitly, that such central-
ization is an almost natural if not necessary process. When the future of a
society is at stake, and do-or-die decisions must be made quickly, people
will not only accept but expect leaders to assume the mantel of crisis
power (cf. Schmitt, 2006). Crisis researchers have subjected this claim
to case-informed scrutiny (‘t Hart et al., 1993). It turns out that central-
ization in times of crisis is rarely absolute. Seemingly centralized crisis
responses typically coexist with different constellations of local power
holders, private sector initiatives and resilient citizens.
Centralization tendencies are also tempered by what researchers refer
to as the ‘bureau-politics’ of crisis governance (Jacobs, 1993; Kalkman
et al., 2018; Rosenthal et al., 1991). One might expect all parts of
government to pull together, set aside ongoing intergovernmental and
interorganizational tugs of war and collaborate seamlessly in service of
the superordinate goal of combatting the joint threat (Parker et al.,
2020). In most countries, this did indeed happen during the early phases
of the COVID-19 crisis, when the primacy of public health considera-
tions and the core values were undisputed, and goal seemed relatively
straightforward (see, for instance, Choi [2020] on South Korea). But
the consensus fragmented as the scope of the crisis expanded. More and
more departments and policy actors began to press for position in the
crisis response machinery, straining cabinet cohesion and complicating the
work of policy coordination.
When governments attempted to expand executive power to ensure
quick decision-making and effective implementation, they faced pushback
on privacy (deploying track and trace apps, appropriating and distributing
patient records), accountability (assuming emergency powers for how
long? Regularly informing parliaments?) and, of course, civil liberties (why
should societies suspend checks and balances in the name of safety and
security for the relative few?). While centralization tendencies did emerge
across the board—including the high-speed crafting and passing of emer-
gency laws—it is an open question whether they ended up boosting
governance capacity as defined above. In France, for instance, important
response failures were related to the rigidities that formalized centraliza-
tion brought about (Hassenteufel, 2020). Much more will be learned in
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time as public administration scholars sort through all the evidence, but
a few preliminary observations can be offered at this early stage.
First, it is clear that crisis centralization shaped the ability of govern-
ments to enforce and maintain heavy lockdown measures. In states where
crisis decision-making was centralized, crisis governments could employ
the full mixture of carrots and sticks to ensure collaboration of (and
between) agencies, subnational governments, citizens and businesses. In
some, the military played a visible role in keeping people off the streets
and keeping workplaces closed. But in states where centralization was
less than complete or not tried, governments could not rely on uniforms
and fines alone. Their governments relied on alternative or complemen-
tary strategies such as ‘sermons’ (persuasion), nudging and piecemeal
consensus-building (see, for instance, Migone [2020] on Canada).
Second, it appears that complete centralization was short-lived at best.
In the course of the crisis, governments faced two types of pushback
(cf. Boin & ‘t Hart, 2012). On the vertical axis, regional and local
administrators (mayors, governors) resisted or got tired of limitations on
their discretionary powers (e.g. Van Overbeke & Stadig, 2020). As the
implementers of centrally formulated policies, they had to enforce unpop-
ular measures. On the horizontal axis—within the executive branch—the
centre of gravity shifted over time from public health agencies to a wider,
more competitive arena that included economic and social policy agencies.
Leaders who were governing through a centralized power structure
sooner or later discovered that their options were, in fact, quite limited.
As adherence to the rules became harder to enforce because people began
to lose their patience, crisis leaders had to adapt their strategies to keep
as many people as possible with the programme.
Third, we can conclude that there was no one-size-fits-all adminis-
trative route to COVID success (Bromfield & McConnell, 2020). The
institutional make-up of governance systems surely mattered: centraliza-
tion was harder to achieve in federal countries than in unitary states. In
federal systems, centralization initiatives met with contention (Benton,
2020; Capano et al., 2020), did not happen or did not endure (e.g.
US, Mexico). Australia, Canada and Germany initially designed effective
regimes, but only Australia managed to eradicate the virus (Dostal, 2020;
Migone, 2020; Rozell & Wilcox, 2020). We may thus cautiously surmise
that the effectiveness of pandemic regimes was not exclusively determined
by political-administrative structures (cf. Capano & Galanti, 2018).
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Crafting Legitimate Responses
Without a minimal degree of legitimacy, government cannot function.
Legitimacy translates into robust support (and compliance) among the
population. In a crisis like COVID-19, when collective behaviour is the
key to effective management of the crisis, legitimacy is probably the most
important asset that governments can possess.
During COVID-19, it proved critically important that citizens trust
their government (Cairney & Wellstead, 2020; Capano et al., 2020;
Cheng, Yu, et al., 2020; Christensen & Laegreid, 2020; Jamieson, 2020;
Wright, 2021). Governments that were seen to be ‘on the ball’ in their
COVID response activities fared well among their publics, at least initially,
whereas governments that appeared to be in denial or paralysed saw drops
in their credibility and support among the public (Herrera et al., 2020;
Jennings et al., 2020; Kim & Kreps, 2020). High legitimacy furthered
rule adherence, which, in turn, helped to quash the pandemic (thus
strengthening the legitimacy of leaders). The reverse was also true: low
legitimacy fuelled shirking on the parts of citizens and businesses, which
undermined effectiveness and, as a result, government legitimacy (Carter
& May, 2020; Wright, 2021).
It is, of course, helpful for leaders and governments to enter a crisis
with solid levels of public support, yet crisis case studies have shown
again and again that it is not essential. Being seen to do well during
a crisis is a powerful booster of leadership capital (Van Delden, 2018).
Examples include the Amsterdam mayor Ed van Thijn and New York City
mayor Rudy Giuliani, both of whom were deeply unpopular when they
suddenly had to manage major crises in their cities. Both emerged from
the crisis with soaring popularity. The same can be said for Australian
Prime Minister Scott Morrison. He entered the COVID-19 crisis with
little public trust to spare after the botched management of the wild-
fires disaster in the previous months, but regained his public standing on
the strength of a more astute and compassionate performance in shaping
Australia’s COVID-19 response.
Several other factors affected the dynamics of public trust in crisis
leaders. We learned, for instance, that it is important to explain why
the imposed pandemic regime deviates from scientific findings or widely
accepted practices elsewhere. The use of face masks illustrates the point.
Initially, there was no science to suggest whether the use of face masks
would be useful. Many Asian countries (with low infection rates) quickly
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made them compulsory, relying on prior experiences and established
cultural practices (An & Tang, 2020).2 Western leaders wrestled with the
question whether to emulate that example. Pointing to the lack of scien-
tific evidence initially worked as an explanation for their decision not to.
But the science began to change, and social demand for tangible, visible
action rose. The same dynamics played out in the domain of education,
where governments bowed to public concerns in deciding to close or
open schools without robust scientific evidence.
Such inconsistencies in policy justifications became a source of discon-
tent among citizens and business operators just when imposed measures
started taking effect in April and May 2020. While scientific advisors,
understandably happy that an effective strategy had been found, argued
that measures were best kept in place as long as possible, public impa-
tience with restrictions translated in an ever-louder call for their rapid
relaxation. Advocates of loosening crisis regimes eagerly made use of
‘new’ scientific insights widely shared on social media—where the number
of arm-chair virologists kept expanding—which seemed to cast doubt on
the efficacy of these measures.
Crisis managers thus faced a continuing policy dilemma between ‘Kan-
tian’ (everybody’s life needs protecting) and ‘utilitarian’ (adopt measures
that provide the greatest good for everybody) policy imperatives. In
the absence of meaningful information, the best approach to solving
this dilemma might be what is known as the ‘pragmatic approach’ to
crisis management (Ansell & Bartenberger, 2019; Ansell & Boin, 2019).
The pragmatist logic is experimentalist: organize quick and rich feedback
flows about the policies you have put in place and act quickly on that
information (adapt if initial measures are shown to be ineffective).
That is not how things generally unfolded during the middle months of
2020. We can describe what happened in terms of ‘politicized’ adaptation:
governments caving into increasing pressure to stop inflicting social and
economic pain. In many countries, leaders succumbed to the pressure and
joined the rush to the exit. In hindsight, it appears clear that this hastened
relaxation of crisis measures allowed the virus to persist and strike again
2The institutional and cultural memory of previous pandemics, such as SARS and
Ebola, left policymakers much better prepared than their colleagues in Western coun-
tries. Previous experiences had prompted these countries to invest heavily in pandemic
contingency preparedness (increasing test capacity, stockpiling PPE and formulating legal
provisions) (An & Tang, 2020).
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(An & Tang, 2020). More importantly, it undermined the credibility of
governments who soon needed to call upon citizens and businesses again
when the second wave hit even harder than the first.
This final phase of the first-wave part of the crisis may well turn out to
have been one of the most problematic periods in the governance of the
pandemic. Deeply fatigued by the long months of ‘flattening the curve’
without destroying their economies, government leaders understood busi-
ness and public desires to return to a normal life all too well. While the
mantra in most places was that ‘we have to learn to live with the virus’,
they swiftly allowed life to return to near-normal. Restrictions still existed,
but the summer vacations in Europe and North America unfolded in
eerily conventional ways. When second waves began to take shape, virol-
ogists were quick to point to the masses of travelling vacationers as being
among the chief drivers.
Those leaders who—again—failed to see the second wave coming
found it hard to get their citizens back on the same page of social
distancing and sacrifice. Those who failed most miserably—President
Trump and Prime Minister Boris Johnson come to mind—saw their
public health systems buckle under ever-increasing pressure. Those who
had gained public trust by highly effective responses to the first wave
could leverage it to impose new rounds of ‘go hard, go fast’ restrictions
to stamp out new spikes—as was the case in New Zealand (Jamieson,
2020).
The Politics of Crisis Governance
The COVID-19 crisis was always deeply political (Maor et al., 2020).
In every country, the virus cast light on issues of authority, power and
legitimacy, how the state wielded power over citizens and businesses. In
some states where the relation between citizens and officials was strained
before the crisis, the response was botched (see, for instance, the US).
Much has been made in this regard of the willingness of citizens with
high levels of trust in their governments to adhere to nudges offered by
their governments (think of Denmark, Finland and Norway).
Public support was a sine qua non for crisis management effectiveness.
With few exceptions, pandemic governments prioritized public health, in
particular the protection of vulnerable citizens. Most sought to accom-
plish this through social distancing measures, lockdowns and the ramping
up of emergency care capacity while scaling down regular healthcare
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services. Citizens had to cooperate to make this happen. Just how impor-
tant their cooperation was, became painfully evident during the second
wave when citizens in many countries lost interest in (or motivation for)
rule adherence.
Trust in public authority can certainly make it easier for crisis leaders
to initiate a constellation of freedom-limiting measures and a power
structure that enables the implementation of those measures. But crisis
management performance matters as well. Sweden is a prime example: its
crisis management regime enjoyed substantial legitimacy, but the country
did not perform better than countries where such trust did not exist.
Australians, on the other hand, entered the crisis with a relatively low
level of trust in their government (which had failed in managing the forest
fires), but still the country managed to suppress the virus pretty well.
Given the importance of citizen behaviour, governments face a conun-
drum. Banking on citizen trust, they may seek to explain the risks and
propose the countermeasures, counting on the sense of responsibility
of smart-thinking people. But by explaining the risks—very low health
impacts for the great majority of people—they might inadvertently nudge
citizens towards pursuing self-interest above the public interest. There
was no running away from the collective action problem that the virus
introduced. Shying away from it by seeking to avoid the frank discussions
that had to be had opened the door to inconsistent or hard-to-explain
measures.
Things never get easier in a protracted crisis like COVID-19. The
money to support people and businesses will run out, sooner or later.
Cutbacks and austerity will erode government capacity. Perceptions of
threat and senses of urgency will wane. Actors that have been side-lined
during the crisis will reassert themselves, slowing down policymaking and
implementation processes. Contentious politics as usual will inevitably be
part and parcel of the ‘new normal’.
As we write this, the roll-out of vaccination programmes in various
countries has become a topic of intense political debate. Getting things
done remains critically important yet frustratingly hard. As the post-acute
stage of the crisis begins to loom, and governments will begin to navigate
the ‘long-shadow’ (‘t Hart & Boin, 2001) phase of the crisis, maintaining
the capacity to deliver is hugely important. The legitimacy of government
and government leaders may well depend on it.
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Abstract Communication is pivotal when a society faces a sudden,
disruptive and disturbing event. People want to know what is going on,
why it is happening, what is done to safeguard them and what they
can to protect themselves. During COVID-19, governments were the
main sources of that information, at least initially. Governments tried to
shape the attitudes, emotions and behaviours of citizens in accordance
with their policies. Over time, alternative crisis narratives emerged and
influenced citizen behaviour. This chapter examines crisis communication
in the COVID-19 crisis: how did leaders try to ‘make making’ of this
unprecedented threat? How did they deal with the alternative crisis frames
that emerged over time?
Keywords Crisis communication · Crisis narratives · Framing contests ·
Meaning making · Leadership credibility · Public trust
My father was left to die alone, at home, without help. We were simply
abandoned. No one deserves an end like that—Bergamo, Italy resident
Silvia Bertuletti, 5 April 2020 (NDTV, 2020)
This is a test for our solidarity, our common sense and care for each other.
And I hope we pass the test—German Prime Minister Angela Merkel,
televised press conference, 11 March 2020 (BBC, 2020)
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Bill Gates will use microchip implants to fight coronavirus, as he revealed
during a Q&A on Reddit, 19 March 2020. (Biohackinfo News, 2020)
The Covid-19 epidemic can teach us a lot about ourselves and our civi-
lization. It reminds us, first of all, of the deep human vulnerability in a
world that has done everything to forget it—French philosopher Corine
Pelluchon, 23 March 2020 (Legros, 2020)
Constructing the Meaning of the COVID-19 Crisis
A bitter complaint about institutional failure wrapped in a jarring story of
personal suffering. A confident assertion of a conspiracy theory. A leader
making a moral appeal to the better angels of our nature. A philosopher
using the pandemic to remind us of our fundamental needs and frailties.
How to get everybody on the same page? Is it really important to do
that? Four different opening quotes, four different interpretations of the
COVID-19 crisis.
Public communication is pivotal when societies face a disruptive,
disturbing and threatening event. People want to know what is going
on, why it is happening, what is done to safeguard them and what they
can do to protect themselves. Governments are expected to provide that
information. They package the information in words that form narratives.
They try to influence how citizens create meaning around the events that
threaten them. We refer to this process in terms of ‘meaning making’
(Boin et al., 2008, 2016).
Meaning making serves different goals and can have unintended
(and undesirable) consequences. The instrumental function of meaning
making is to provide a persuasive narrative that encourages people to
support (or question) specific policy choices. The empowering function
of meaning making is to help people make informed crisis response deci-
sions. Its political function is to underpin claims about legitimacy: to
foster, restore or challenge public trust in public authority figures and
public confidence in institutions, systems and processes.
It is by no means a simple communication task. What makes it a
complex process is that governments are not the only actors trying to
‘make meaning’ of a crisis. The broad consensus to ‘take the politics out
of this’ that typically prevails during the acute stage of a major emer-
gency gives way to division and politicization once the most urgent sense
of threat has receded (Boin et al., 2008; Kaniasty & Norris, 2004).
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The online universe offers limitless possibilities to exercise voice. Politi-
cians, stakeholders, victims, journalists, expert commentators, lawyers,
social influencers and protest groups will promote a wild variety of crisis
narratives that challenge those forwarded by government authorities and
subject matter experts. In this fragmented, real-time communication envi-
ronments, authorities have very little time to first make sense of a crisis
internally before communicating a narrative that dominates and fulfils the
three functions outlined above.
In this chapter, we discuss how leaders ‘made meaning’ around the
COVID-19 crisis. A basic policy and communicative dilemma bedevilled
many government leaders during this pandemic. They had to do their
utmost to prevent people from becoming sick and to save as many lives as
possible. They had to weigh public health risks against the socio-economic
impacts of lockdown measures. To influence collective behaviour—criti-
cally important, as we saw in the previous chapter—leaders had to be
effective in explaining how they dealt with this dilemma. Many leaders
wrestled with the challenge, with various degrees of success. Some failed
miserably or did not even try (it is hard to see the difference from afar).
Some leaders shone and were also highly effective in suppressing the virus.
The Rise and Fall of Crisis Narratives
The Dutch government initially rode a wave of public support. The public
mood of shock after the first social distancing measures was immedi-
ately followed by an outpouring of prosocial behaviour. The high level
of compliance with imposed restrictions was widely considered the result
of Prime Minister Rutte’s meaning-making skills. In a powerful speech
to the nation, Rutte emphasized collective solidarity, voluntary compli-
ance and admiration for the ‘heroes’ of the first-line medical response.
A regime of frequent press conferences and parliamentary briefings—
performed mostly by the prime minister, the senior health minister
and the chair of the Outbreak Management Team—resonated strongly.
Millions tuned into the televised press conferences. The government’s
messaging dominated the airwaves as well as social media.
The national consensus dissipated with the first wave. Once the acute
health threat had receded, critics began to nibble at the government’s
narrative. They started asking poignant questions. Why had the spread
of the virus come as a surprise? How could it run rampant in the nursing
homes, killing so many elderly? Why had we not stockpiled critical medical
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supplies? Why had we allowed our health system to become so lean and
efficient that it lacked the requisite IC capacity—essential for any large-
scale disaster? Why did it take such a long time to ramp up testing
capacity? Why did national leaders and experts so adamantly oppose
the use of face masks? Why were the schools closed (when experts had
advised against it)? Were all those measures really necessary? Could the
government not have relaxed measures a bit sooner?
Questions gave rise to counter-narratives. One narrative suggested that
the Dutch government had failed to act in time, and another claimed
that the imposed lockdown had been unnecessary. These narratives were
illustrated with stories of other nations that had done better on infection
counts and mortality rates. In both types of narratives, experts had read
the situation all wrong and leaders had failed to see the obvious.
The competing crisis narratives emerged as non-compliance with social
distancing measures increased. Government ministers reacted with harsh
comments, breaking with the government’s reliance on ‘soft power’ and
nudging. Protest groups formed, some rapidly gaining a noisy following.
Social media started to fill with messages of despair, frustration, anger and
mistrust. Conspiracy theories made the rounds on internet. The govern-
ment’s proposed emergency legislation, extending its executive powers,
met with resistance from an unlikely combination of legal scholars,
left-leaning social activists and conservative libertarians. With a national
election looming in March 2021, government measures and the narrative
underpinning were increasingly scrutinized and contested.
And then the second wave hit. Prime Minister Rutte and his team
thought they could appeal to common sense and solidarity, which had
worked so well in quelling the first wave. But the tried-and-trusted narra-
tive no longer worked. People had learned that the risk of becoming ill
was very low for most. The cacophony of expert advice made it easy
for people to pick and choose the explanation they liked best. When
Dutch leaders sharpened their tone, they met a wall of derision (“they
are blaming the citizens again”). After several tries to reign in collective
behaviour, the government finally resorted to a lockdown that was much
stricter than the one imposed during the first wave.
And so it was, mutatis mutandis, in many other countries: initial surges
in support and corresponding successes, but also dominant narratives
encountering a growing sense of unease, concern and contestation. Coun-
tries that were also experiencing major ‘second waves’ and thus prolonged
or renewed restrictions were seeing growing ‘reactance’ to government
4 CRAFTING CRISIS NARRATIVES 69
messaging (Frailing & Harper, 2017). In some countries—the US and the
UK come to mind—the progression to politicization and frame conflicts
was rapid and steep.
But other countries saw remarkably high levels of sustained agreement
about the nature of the challenge, the values that should be prioritized
and the broad thrust of the emergency measures taken. This did not just
happen in countries where the curve was flattened rapidly, such as South
Korea and New Zealand, but also in hard-hit jurisdictions like Sweden or
Mexico.
Many factors affect the perception of governance success in a crisis
like COVID-19 (Bromfield & McConnell, 2020). The massive prob-
lems in their health systems, the socio-economic consequences of the
crisis regime, tensions within ruling parties and intergovernmental rela-
tions, the timing of the pandemic in relation to the electoral cycle (in the
US), the dynamics of a pre-existing crisis (Brexit, in the UK)—these were
undoubtedly factors at play in this or that country. Culturally contingent
attitudes to risk, loss and institutional failure also weigh into the narra-
tives that will be told about this catastrophe (Bovens & ‘t Hart, 1996;
Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Green, 1997).
A critically important factor, as we argue in this chapter, is the
communicative performance of leaders and the congruence between their
words and their governments’ deeds (cf. Brunsson, 1989; Mintrom &
O’Connor, 2020). To be effective, leaders have to win the ‘framing
contests’ (Boin et al., 2009) in which politicians, journalists, stakeholders,
technical experts and social media gurus participate with so much gusto.
Government elites once enjoyed some a priori advantages in these
contests, due to their access to vital information, highly used and trusted
communication channels, and the support of specialized advisers. But
their ‘standing’ among large parts of the public, often low to begin with,
and possibly further attenuated by the occurrence of unsettling events
has created a more even playing field (Ignatieff, 2012, pp. 114–135). It
provides critics of the government response with opportunities to influ-
ence people who have become receptive to ‘counter frames’ (because they
are, for instance, dismayed to discover that governments are bungling
their responses).
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The Power of Words
Spector (2020) reminds us that the word “crisis” is a label. Crises are
socially constructed phenomena. The claim that a particular set of events
and circumstances constitutes a crisis is “always an assertion of power and
an expression of interests”, as the “facts [of the events] never speak for
themselves… [and] always await the assignment of meaning” (Spector,
2020, p. 305). Through active communication (or refraining from it),
political leaders try to stick the label on a situation—or they actively work
against labelling this or that situation as a crisis.
The vocabulary of crisis communication can be thought of as a layered
cake. Each layer contains higher levels of complexity, ambiguity and polit-
ical import. The bottom layer consists of terms like ‘flood’, ‘earthquake’
‘explosion’, ‘demonstration’, ‘wildfire’, ‘bankruptcy’, ‘explosion’, ‘col-
lision’, ‘exodus’, ‘drought’ and ‘hostage-taking’. They offer relatively
straightforward descriptors of non-routine events in the physical world.
They often dominate early media reports of newly occurring disrup-
tions. They provide levers for ‘placing’ the basic features of events into
the public consciousness. They can be purposefully used to provide rela-
tively detached, factual, de-politicized accounts of events. For that reason,
they are part and parcel of the meaning-making repertoires of operational
agencies and technical experts.
The second layer consists of interpretative labels used to frame the situ-
ation cognitively, emotionally and politically. This layer includes terms
like ‘incident’, ‘accident’, ‘disaster’, ‘riot’, ‘scandal’, ‘fiasco’, ‘catastro-
phe’ and ‘tragedy’. These words help to tell stories. They allow the
storyteller to appeal to commonly held cognitive and emotional scripts.
Some of these ostensibly descriptive terms are, in fact, full of norma-
tive content, and thus politically consequential in that they portray actors
and events in particular ways and convey value judgements. Think of:
‘cover up’, ‘freedom fighters’, ‘terrorists’, ‘heroes’, ‘red tape’, ‘incom-
petence’ and ‘mismanagement’. The adjectives used matter greatly, too.
Denoting those who partake in Black Lives Matters manifestations as
‘peaceful protestors’ or ‘dangerous radicals’ or government responses to
a disaster as ‘bungled’, ‘bureaucratic’, ‘coordinated’ or ‘agile’ reflects
different vantage points and different strategic intent on the part of the
speakers.
The third layer consists of explicit crisis language. Over time, the term
crisis has acquired a host of meanings and has been broken down into
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numerous typologies. In the medical world, a crisis marks the stage in an
illness where the patient either improves markedly or worsens and possibly
dies. In other words, crisis as a fork in the road. Likewise, in the Chinese
language, the character 危机(Wéij̄ı) combines terms referring to danger
or precariousness, and ‘changing point’. Such ambiguity is absent in polit-
ical parlance. In the political world and in media discourse, describing a
community, a public issue or a government project, policy or organization
as being ‘in crisis’ signals serious trouble: something drastic needs to be
done urgently to counter the threat and contain the damage.
Applying the crisis label is not mere wordplay. Crisis talk matters. It
opens the door to ‘claims of urgency’ (Spector, 2019): calls for urgent
measures and urgent questioning of the system’s safety, reliability and
integrity. The crisis label implies an urgent promotion of action, pack-
aged in a critique of the beliefs, values and interests underpinning ‘the way
things get done around here’. Crisis talk provides language that can be
used to convey the existence of threats to the common cause. It also offers
a semantic platform for launching appeals to reconfirm, repair, reform
or repudiate the systemic status quo. The effective use of crisis language
moves the relevant system(s) into a critical juncture, a moment to recon-
sider what it is, what it does and what it could or should do and how it
should adapt and change.
Table 4.1 maps the architecture of meaning making in times of disrup-
tion. It juxtaposes ‘physical’ event characteristics, the key rhetorical tropes
that tend to be present in the accounts of actors and observers, and
the (intended and unintended) meaning-making implications of these
framing efforts. It is important to note that the three columns are loosely
coupled—the three types of talk are deployed to construct believable
links between events and the meanings attributed to the events by actors,
stakeholders and publics alike.
Framing Contests
In any given crisis, multiple accounts of the what, where, who, how
and what are on offer. But only a limited number of recurring story-
lines constitute the heart of the framing contest. Political leaders follow
remarkably similar framing trajectories (cf. Kuipers & Brändström, 2003).
According to De Vries (2004, p. 612), officials “will always try to avoid
a framework in which they are personally held responsible” (…). They
will try to frame a crisis or disaster “in terms of a natural framework. If
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this is not possible, they will try to blame the disaster on the policy”. In
other words, they will emphasize exogenous causes, moving the onus of
accountability away from them.
That type of storyline emphasizes exogenous forces of geography,
weather, foreign powers, higher levels of government, international
markets, multinational corporations and technological dependencies. It
points to the many hands syndrome by explaining that the events in
question are the product of complex systems and processes traversing
geographical, jurisdictional, hierarchical and disciplinary boundaries; it
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follows that ‘no one’ (no single point of authority and control) is in
charge (Bovens, 1998). It reminds audiences of the limits of hierarchical
or political control that leaders and managers can exercise: it is impos-
sible to monitor and prevent each human error of operational staff and
first-line management (Reason, 1990). It highlights the unforeseeability
of the crisis, pointing towards the “unknown unknowns” that lurk in any
system, and more so in large, dynamic, transboundary, non-linear systems
(Perrow, 1999).
The political upshot of these narratives is that they serve to de-
escalate, exculpate elites and divert attention towards deeper flaws and
tensions in the institutional design and power realities of the existing
system. They direct negative emotions about what is happening and
why it is happening down (to lower-level staff), out (to other actors,
sectors, foreign powers, known enemies) and, depending on the narrator’s
vantage point, up (senior management, corporate ‘fat cats’, international
institutions). The indirect message is that people should be happy that the
leader is willing to assume the task of crisis management when all these
forces are conspiring against the leader.
The French President, Emmanuel Macron, made liberal use of military
metaphors to communicate not only the gravity of the threat but also his
government’s resolve to prioritize the health and safety of his citizens.
Macron’s rhetorical style befitted the historical script of the Fifth Repub-
lic’s presidency. No doubt inspired by his illustrious predecessor, General
Charles de Gaulle,
Macron consistently developed a “war” framework, designating the virus as
an enemy. This type of framing suggests that the attacking force originates
outside society. The President thus declared a “general mobilisation” on
March 12, de described crisis management as a war effort on March 16,
and further refined this line of argument in his March 20 address, which is
entirely structured around war metaphors: deceased nurses “falling” during
the crisis, a response organised around “lines [of defense]”, “the children
of the nation” “fighting” against the virus. The President’s speeches call
for a “national unity” to defend the nation. (Brandt & Wörlein, 2020)
At the other end of the meaning-making continuum, we find a cluster
of interpretive frames that endogenise the causes of crisis. These are, in
essence, accusatory narratives. They resist the idea that negative events
are ‘Acts of God’, isolated incidents or other people’s faults. These frames
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problematize the crisis as a symptom of endemic, or underlying, problems.
Instead of getting elites off the hook, they put them in the spotlight.
Instead of obfuscating issues of power, privilege, inequality and injustice,
these accounts highlight them.
These narratives do not legitimate response and recovery strategies
that seek to restore the status quo. They rather suggest a dire need for
learning, change and reform. In their most trenchant form, they advocate
wholesale repudiation of the status quo: think of (neo-)Marxist and crit-
ical theory accounts of recessions, welfare state problems and other ‘crises
of capitalism’ (Habermas, 1975; Kliman, 2011; Offe, 1976) or calls for
a complete abandonment of intrinsically dangerous industries (Perrow,
1999).
Endogenous crisis narratives animate an activist politics of investiga-
tion, accountability and blame that is often welcomed by those who are
on the outer edge of the system and those who have felt powerless to
change it. When widely given credulity, endogenous crisis narratives can
generate public anxiety and anger (Coombs et al., 2010; Jin, 2010). As
these emotions will find political expression one way or the other, endoge-
nous crisis narratives can cause serious problems for governing elites (Boin
et al., 2008).
News outlets will relentlessly focus on deficiencies and blind spots in
existing policies, plans, preparations, training and resourcing, serving up
dramatic examples of poor information-sharing and miscommunication
between policymakers, agencies and levels of government. More fuel is
added when social media fill with conspiratorial accounts in which the
crisis is explained as the outcome of deliberately engineering by malev-
olent elites pursuing pernicious agendas, under cover of the ‘fake news’
media. All this creates an atmosphere in which large constituencies no
longer know who or what to believe and lose trust in experts, policy-
makers, and the systems and processes governing their lives (cf. Krause
et al., 2020; Oyeyemi et al., 2014; Van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017).
Winning Factors?
The outcome of the contest between competing crisis narratives is hard to
predict. Why can governments sometimes ‘control the narrative’ almost
without challenge, whereas in other occasions narrative dominance eludes
them entirely (Olsson & Nord, 2015; You & Ju, 2019)?
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We can offer some plausible inferences (Boin et al., 2009; Coombs,
2015). One revolves around the placement of a crisis in political time:
governing elites are more likely to lose the battle when the crisis unfolds
towards the end of an electoral cycle, or when it follows on the back of
a recent or otherwise vividly remembered historical precedent. Another
is media slant: when key news media have already turned highly critical
about incumbent elites, any new incident will help to push ‘endogenized’
crisis narratives. A third concerns duration: it is much more difficult for
governments (or any other actors) to achieve and maintain meaning-
making dominance in protracted, slow-burning crises as opposed to
relatively short and episodic ones (Boin et al., 2021; cf. ‘t Hart & Boin,
2001).
The strategies and conduct of the people and groups engaging in crisis
communication remain a crucial factor, whether they be political leaders
and top officials (Boin et al., 2010; Jong, 2017; Masters & ‘t Hart,
2012), corporate CEOs and communication professionals (Coombs,
2007; Coombs & Holladay, 2006; Hearit, 2006), media outlets (Olsson
et al., 2015), celebrity activists (Marsh et al., 2010; Richey & Budabin,
2016), social influencers (Enke & Borchers, 2019) or social media users
at large (Austin & Jin, 2017; Vos & Buckner, 2016).
Why do they ‘win’ or ‘lose’ crisis-framing contests? This question opens
the door to the other questions. What was their reputation and credibility
prior to the crisis? What rhetorical styles do they employ? What framing,
casting, scripting techniques do these use? What forms of non-verbal
communication do they engage in? Do they instigate or participate in
public rituals of grieving, protest, animosity, conciliation, remembrance?
Do they show empathy (Dryhurst et al., 2020; ‘t Hart, 1993)? When and
how often do they communicate? How does their messaging evolve over
time? What channels do they use, and how do they adapt the content
and the style of their messaging to those channels? How do they respond
to criticism and accusations (denials, admissions, excuses, apologies)? Do
they go at it alone, or do they engage in jointly crafted and communicated
crisis framing?
We should also look at the ‘receiving audiences’ to understand how
people ‘make meaning’ of a crisis over time, both individually (Park,
2016) and collectively (Fischer-Pressler et al., 2019; Hirschberger, 2018).
Which messaging and which speakers draw the attention of mass publics?
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Who is believed and who is mistrusted by which audiences? Which narra-
tives are adopted and repeated in the deliberations of political forums
(Vliegenthart & Damstra, 2019)?
The mountain of research findings that has been produced has not
as yet added up to robust theories that can explain and predict the
dynamics and outcomes of political crisis communication. But it does
provide us with analytical tools to examine the meaning-making dynamics
of COVID-19, which we will do next.
Making Meaning of COVID-19
From a meaning-making perspective, the pandemic had a combination of
features that made it particularly challenging to impose authoritative crisis
narratives. One such feature is its unusually long duration. At the time of
writing, the threat had been ‘live’ for almost a year with no immediate end
in sight. Maintaining the public’s attention and preserving government
credibility proved a hard challenge for many government leaders. Whether
it was on the infectiousness and lethality of the virus, the effects of face
masks and school closures, the relative merits of compulsory versus volun-
tary containment regimes, the prospective benefits of contact-tracing
technologies or the social, economic, political and geostrategic impacts
of the crisis, each layer of meaning making—factual accounts, causal
interpretations, accountability claims and ‘what-now’ narratives—had to
be adapted with each shift in the balance of intended and unintended
consequences of earlier crisis responses.
In countries like Norway, where high levels of public trust in govern-
ment combined with swift and successful responses to the first wave, crisis
communication was relatively straightforward (Christensen & Laegreid,
2020). Yet, regardless of the success in dealing with the first wave,
community scepticism, a sense of loss and social distress gave rise
to counter-narratives as the social costs of the imposed crisis regime
mounted. Unease about the use of emergency powers and the quality of
democracy found expression in high-profile demonstrations, legal chal-
lenges, critical reports by legal scholars and human rights groups, as well
as ‘robust’ discourse across both the traditional and social media (Bieber,
2020; Seyhan, 2020).
Conspiracy theories emerged with regard to the origins of the virus
and the ‘agendas’ that were purportedly served by the pandemic (Islam
et al., 2020). Donald Trump’s ‘China virus’ label came and went relatively
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quickly, but other conspiratorial accounts—featuring, among others, Bill
Gates, George Soros, Big Pharma and the Deep State—gained trac-
tion well beyond the fringe networks where they originated (Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020; Mian & Khan, 2020). The
appeal of these conspiracy accounts was particularly strong in countries or
among groups with low trust in public institutions. Early ‘misinformation-
busting’ efforts by the UN, the WHO and the CDC made no inroads
(e.g. WHO, 2020).
Even as scientists kept amassing knowledge about the virus at an
impressive and possibly unprecedented rate, uncertainty about the virus,
its impacts and the best response persisted and deepened. This created
a sense-making vacuum that opened the door to information warfare.
The editors of The Lancet (2020) referred to an ‘infodemic’. Authori-
ties have found it increasingly difficult to explain and justify their policies
by pointing to the scientific authority of their expert advisers. Early-stage
deference to expertise gave way to widespread questioning of that exper-
tise (Perry et al., 2020). Claims such as ‘they know best’ or ‘this has
proven to work’ lost their appeal over time.
This erosion of government ability to craft authoritative narratives
was exacerbated by different experts saying different things, a logical
and usually desirable result of the institutional fragmentation of scientific
expertise. In open societies, anyone with medical or science credentials
could find platforms on which to question the evidence base under-
pinning official narratives about testing, rules and practices of social
distancing, the effectiveness of lockdowns and facemasks, the wisdom of
school closures, and the expected timing and safety of vaccines (Camargo,
2020; Reiss & Bhakdi, 2020).
The protracted duration of the crisis and the pervasive uncertainty
gave room for an unusual factor to play out in full: the impatience of
Modern Man. In fast-burning crises, impatience rarely plays a role of
importance. In the COVID-19 crisis, impatience with the duration of the
crisis regime, the slow roll-out of the vaccines and the growing perception
of governmental incompetence (justified or not) posed new communica-
tion challenges for leaders. To ‘see light at the end of the tunnel’ was
not enough. Citizens and business owners wanted to know when the
crisis would end. Even vague promises would be employed as markers
of progress, which undermined the willingness of leaders to make any
promises.
78 A. BOIN ET AL.
The COVID-19 crisis had to be managed without a roadmap. Most
government leaders and scientists studiously and sensibly avoided pinning
themselves down on the million dollar question of ‘when will there be
a vaccine?’ Governments made do with placeholder notions such as ‘the
new normal’ or the ‘1,5 meter society’ and by replacing one time-limited
set of support package with another. As beacons for longer-term expec-
tations and strategic decision-making, these notions were of limited use.
When the vaccines finally (and quite suddenly) materialized, government
leaders wrestled with the vagaries of a massive roll-out and the escalating
patience of various groups demanding priority in the vaccination process.
The transboundary and global nature of the pandemic created a
social laboratory for comparing and rhetorically ‘benchmarking’ pandemic
responses (cf. Baekkeskov, 2015). It provided critics with ample ammu-
nition in their questioning why ‘we’ were not doing what ‘they’ were
doing. Since there were so many variables to consider, so many data
points available (Cheng et al., 2020) and so many pandemic response
regimes involved, countless comparisons could be drawn, suited to the
comparators’ purposes and proclivities (Anderssen et al., 2020; Capano
et al., 2020; Greer et al., 2020).
‘Outlier’ jurisdictions whose policy settings or leadership rhetoric
differed markedly from those of other governments invited intense
coverage, analysis and commentary worldwide (Ortega & Orsini, 2020).
The crisis responses of female government leaders and chief health offi-
cers were favourably compared to those of male counterparts, invoking
infection rates and deaths as evidence. It was powerful rhetoric, but
questionable science (e.g. Cherneski, 2020; Sergent & Stajkovic, 2020).
Debates about school closures and the use of facemasks inevitably refer-
enced experiences in other countries.
Sweden’s COVID-19 experience featured in many comparisons (Irwin,
2020). At least six narratives emerged during the first few months, each of
which was misleading in one way or another: (1) life is normal in Sweden,
(2) Sweden has a herd immunity strategy, (3) Sweden is not following
expert advice, (4) Sweden is not following WHO recommendations, (5)
the Swedish approach is failing and (6) Swedes trust the government (cf.
Nygren & Olofsson, 2020; Pierre, 2020). In similar vein, the performance
of countries such as South Korea, Vietnam, Australia and New Zealand,
which initially managed to prevent surging rates of infections or managed
to ‘flatten the curve’ quicker than others, was (prematurely) framed as
guiding ‘examples’ (Lee et al., 2020; Oh et al., 2020).
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Another guiding example was the meaning-making performance by the
Prime Minister of New Zealand, Jacinda Ardern. A politically astute gun-
law reformer, Ardern had gained global recognition for her performance
as a genuine and caring ‘healer-in-chief’ in the wake of the mass shootings
at the Christchurch mosque. Ardern had become such a master of social
media communication that her Facebook following alone was four times
greater than those of the other seven main party leaders combined. She
performed what has been dubbed ‘a master class in political leadership’
(Wilson, 2020) after the coronavirus landed on her country’s doorstep
(Kapitan, 2020).
A Long Rollercoaster Ride
Crisis communication is always a delicate business (Frandsen & Johansen,
2020). Making meaning of the protracted COVID-19 mega-crisis has
proven to be even harder still. Threats that morph. Uncertainties that do
not abate. New uncertainties that arise. Unintended but inevitable nega-
tive consequences of control measures that hurt more and more. Public
moods and risk equations that shift as a result. Actions taken by other
governments and companies that cannot be controlled but affect one’s
constituents.
As curves were being flattened, acute public health fears subsided and
the full extent of the losses sustained by communities and businesses
sank in, government press conferences had to contend with more and
louder voices of despair and dissent. Government claims were being chal-
lenged. The language of ‘we’ gave way to ‘us and them’. Support gave
way to rage, as lockdowns were being re-imposed in many places. In the
framing contests between exogenous and endogenous accounts of what
had happened and what it all meant, the latter gained prominence during
the course of the crisis (Morgan, 2020).
When vaccinations started to make inroads, yet another round of
complex meaning-making challenges emerged: how to maintain social
discipline among the growing proportion of the population that can stop
fearing the virus even as their economic prospects take a turn for the
worse; how to craft believable narratives about the end of the crisis, the
lessons to be learned and the futures that can be carved.
The roller coaster of COVID-19 meaning making will likely continue
for years to come.
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Abstract How will societies emerge from the COVID-19 crisis? Will
there be a reckoning with failing institutions and crisis leaders? Will valu-
able lessons be learned? These are the perennial questions that dominate
the transitional phase between crisis and a new normal. In this chapter,
we discuss how lessons from previous crises help to understand the many
challenges that lie ahead of us.
Keywords COVID-19 · Public inquiries · Accountability · Learning ·
Crisis termination
Those who made mistakes will have to answer our questions and take on
their own responsibilities. We ask for justice.—A grass roots movement set
up by Italian COVID-19 survivors (Noi Denunceremo, 2020)
The only prediction about the future of politics that can be made with
any certainty is that the ‘COVID crisis’ is sure to unleash an outbreak of
divisive and disruptive political blame games as politicians, policymakers,
advisers and experts all seek to avoid carrying the can for those decisions
or opinions that inevitably turned out to be wrong. (Flinders, 2020)
There are plenty of things that people say and will say that we got wrong
and we owe that discussion and that honesty to the tens of thousands
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who have died before their time.—Boris Johnson (quoted in Parker et al.,
2020)
Even as we fight this pandemic, we must be readying ourselves for future
global outbreaks and the many other challenges of our time such as antimi-
crobial resistance, inequality and the climate crisis. COVID-19 has taken
so much from us. But it is also giving us an opportunity to break with
the past and build back better.—WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom
Ghebreyesus (WHO, 2020)
The Need for Closure
It is hard to imagine as we write this, but one day the COVID-19 crisis
will be over. Critics will have their say, as Prime Minister Boris Johnson
and Professor Flinders predicted (see above). Calls for justice will be met
by promises that lessons will be learned. The quotes above tell the story
in a nutshell.
The pandemic will not disappear overnight. Pandemics fizzle out in
a process of gradual domestication of a once mortal threat (Holmberg
et al., 2017; McNeill, 1976; Rosenberg, 1992). This can happen through
herd immunity or the development of an effective vaccine. We are lucky:
an epic race between dozens of research universities and pharma labs has
resulted in an almost unimaginably speedy process of vaccine delivery.
Modern biomedicine has delivered the ‘quick fix’, compared to the much
slower process leading to herd immunity.
But the large-scale societal crisis born from the pandemic will not
simply fizzle out. Crisis closure is important for a society that wants to
reach a point where it has learned to live with all facets of the crisis.
Vaccines alone will not bring an end to the manifold economic, social,
institutional and political conundrums the pandemic has caused. A crisis
that is not effectively brought to a close can linger on for years if not
decades (Boin et al., 2016).
Without effective closure of the crisis, fateful choices made during the
crisis will continue to spark conflict. The central policy question of the
crisis—how to protect human lives and at what economic and social costs
to society as a whole?—has come into ever sharper relief as the crisis
endured and expanded. The dilemma has pervaded cabinet, parliamen-
tary and public deliberations in every country. Divisions have run deep.
Referring the matter to ‘experts’ and relying on ‘evidence’ unsurprisingly
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have not helped overcome them. Every major spike in infections brought
the conflict back in full force.
Traditionally, societies have evolved a suite of interrelated mecha-
nisms to achieve crisis closure: rituals of accountability, learning and
commemoration. In combination, and when performed in accordance
with prevailing public expectations and social norms, these rituals facilitate
a form of catharsis—an abatement of collective stress, a cooling down of
political heat and a broad societal willingness to turn the page and move
on.
The Politics of Accountability
The disaster sociologist Lee Clarke (1999) once observed that “crises,
disasters and scandals result in public disquiet and in loss of confidence
in the body of politics. Confidence can be effectively restored only by
thoroughly investigating and establishing the truth and exposing the facts
to public scrutiny” (p. 8). Before the COVID-19 crisis has come to an
end, many scholars, advocates, NGOs and think tanks have already begun
to analyse it. Official inquiries will focus on the causes of the pandemic
and the responses to it. There likely will be series of detailed, revealing and
often painful hearings. Victims will tell powerful stories of their suffering.
We can easily imagine that the following findings—in one shape or
another—will emerge from these inquiries:
• We increased our vulnerability to viral pandemics by the way we
organized our economies, our culture of leisure, our supply chains
and our health systems.
• We allowed the pandemic to take us by surprise. Warning signals
were ignored. Our risk perceptions and the state of emergency
preparedness were clouded by an erroneous reliance on soothing
historical analogies with ‘near misses’—deadly viruses such as Ebola,
SARS and H1N1 that were effectively prevented from escalating into
global pandemics. These plans did not work for COVID-19.
• Institutional failures of imagination fed a sense of complacency with
regard to the state of preparation for pandemics. The result: societies
lacked elementary resources to combat the pandemic.
• The pandemic ruthlessly hit hardest those in already precarious
positions. COVID-19 exposed entrenched inequalities in health,
education, work, housing and well-being.
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• Government leaders found it hard to make uncomfortable decisions
that required substantial sacrifices from large parts of the population.
• The first wave of the pandemic was characterized by a myopic and
reactive response mode. We did too little to prepare our popu-
lations and systems for second waves, vaccination campaigns and
post-pandemic innovation.
Crisis inquiries tend to follow a similar script: they reconstruct the course
of events; describe pre-existing rules, structures, policies and responsi-
bilities; establish who did what, when and how in both the lead up
and the response to the crisis; offer causal interpretations; evaluate the
performance of people, organizations, structures and processes; and make
recommendations with regard to sanctions that should be meted out.
Heroes and good practices will be identified and lauded. Policymakers
will offer rationalizations. Apologies will be demanded (Boin et al., 2008;
Lipsky & Olson, 1977; Mintrom et al., 2020; Platt, 1971; Stark, 2018,
2019).
Governments do not always welcome such inquiries. It may take prod-
ding, lobbying and looming reputational damage before an inquiry is
initiated. In hard-hit Spain, for example, a group of doctors feared that
no inquiry was forthcoming. They published an open letter to their
government in the prominent medical journal The Lancet, “calling for
an independent and impartial evaluation by a panel of international and
national experts, focusing on the activities of the Central Government and
of the governments of the 17 autonomous communities” (García-Basteiro
et al., 2020). It was a deeply political act. Outsiders were to investigate
Spaniards. Not just the health system was to be scrutinised but the ‘social
and economic circumstances’—a thinly veiled reference to a decade of
austerity policies that had undermined Spain’s pandemic preparedness.
Inquiries might provide a firm footing for learning. It could lead to
a catharsis for traumatized victims and badly-shaken communities (think
of the truth commissions in South Africa). But most crisis inquiries are,
first and foremost, deeply political at heart. Their very design involves
choices that are highly consequential and therefore highly contested.
These choices pertain to the scope and aim of the inquiry, the people who
will run it, the moment of delivery and the available resources. In their
case study of the 9/11 Commission’s work, Parker and Dekker (2008)
offered the following observation:
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The 9/11 Commission was established only after a drawn-out political
struggle. It was not until 14 months after the attacks on the Twin Towers
and the Pentagon that an independent panel was established. The Bush
administration, in particular, opposed the formation of an independent
commission. It argued that a Congressional joint inquiry into the attacks
was more than adequate and that an independent blue-ribbon commission
was an unnecessary distraction from the war on terror. …The families of
the victims insisted that a broader inquiry was needed. Public pressure and
an effective lobbying campaign persuaded enough House Republicans to
join Democrats and produce a majority vote on 25 July 2002 to set up an
independent commission. Still, the White House continued to resist… It
took another two months of intense negotiations before the White House
reached an agreement with Congress on the conditions under which the
investigation would be conducted…. (pp. 266–269)
Critics will liken the accountability process to a ‘blame game’ and will
accuse policymakers of blame avoidance. This frame can easily become an
interpretive straightjacket that degrades the motives and actions of both
account-givers and account-holders. With such a prism firmly in place,
one might easily forget the broader functions of accountability and the
essential standards by which we should assess its enactment (Bovens et al.,
2008):
• Are democratically legitimized bodies able to monitor and evaluate
executive behaviour?
• Can they induce executive actors to modify that behaviour in
accordance with their preferences?
• Does accountability help to unearth and curtail the abuse of execu-
tive power and privilege?
• Does it help office-holders and organizations to effectively perform
their public tasks (cf. Schillemans, 2016)?
In the charged context of a protracted mega-crisis such as COVID-19,
it will not be easy to fulfil these functions. For one, the transboundary
nature of this crisis is an ill fit for existing jurisdiction-based, sectorial
response capacities (Boin, 2019). The policy environment for COVID-19
spans across multiple sectors of society, levels of government and indeed
nation-state boundaries. As a result, it becomes difficult to pinpoint where
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responsibility lies, and therefore who are to be the relevant account-
givers—and by whom and how they ought to be held to account (Bovens,
1998).
Moreover, the intricate, uncertain and sometimes unprecedented
nature of the pandemic makes it difficult to determine by what stan-
dards account-holders should assess the performance of office-holders,
agencies, supply chains and networks prior to and during the pandemic.
Also, given the ongoing nature of the COVID-19 crisis, account-holders
struggle with the question of when to begin, how to pace and for how
long to sustain accountability proceedings.
Pressure and Opportunities
Media, commentators and political scientists are often preoccupied with
the question whether authority figures will lose their jobs as a result of
accountability processes. This is understandable. The iron law of politics
holds that when something bad has happened which is considered unac-
ceptable, someone should (be forced to) ‘take their responsibility’. That
does not mean that those in charge of the crisis response will necessarily
‘do the honourable thing’ of their own accord (Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2010).
When cruise ship The Ruby Princess arrived in New South Wales
(NSW), Australia, in March 2020 with a few corona cases on board,
it presented state health authorities with a first test of their pandemic
preparedness. The inquiry into what happened next produced a blunt
assessment (Special Commission of Inquiry, 2020, p. 32). But the NSW
Health staff and the responsible minister all kept their jobs. The latter’s
colleague in the bordering state of Victoria was not so lucky: when it
transpired that mismanagement of hotel quarantine supervision had been
at the heart of that state’s big and lethal ‘second wave’, Health Minister
Jenny Mikakos and several top bureaucrats were forced to resign (cf. The
Board of Inquiry, 2020).
An internal review into the breakdown of quarantine arrangements
that led to the reintroduction of corona into COVID-free New Zealand,
conducted at lightning speed by three experienced hands, was equally
blunt about ministerial performance. It called a spade a spade. The health
minister was sacked by the same prime minister, Jacinda Ardern, who
would go on to win the election four months later in spectacular fashion
(Menon, 2020; Roy, 2020).
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This is how accountability unfolds during and after crises: intense
discussions about who bears responsibility for what has occurred and
what, if any, consequences should flow from these assessments. In times
of crises, accountability processes are supposed to bring clarity, facilitate
performance assessment, guide sanctioning and contribute to closure.
In spite of valiant attempts, researchers find it hard to predict how
accountability rituals will unfold and whether they will serve their social
function of extinguishing the flames of collective stress (Boin et al., 2008;
Bovens et al., 1999; Hinterleitner & Sager, 2015; Hood et al., 2016;
Resodihardjo et al., 2016). But we do know which factors matter in
shaping the outcome. Much depends on institutional context, timing, the
presence or absence of distractions and scapegoats, and the ever-evolving
political calculus of key authority figures. Political capital is another impor-
tant factor: office-holders enter a crisis with variable reputations and
‘credit’ as shaped by their prior performances and their level of centrality
in the ruling government’s power edifice (Brändström, 2016; De Ruiter,
2019; Kuipers & Brändström, 2020; Resodihardjo, 2020).
Effects of the Accountability Process
The accountability process can have a profound effect on the public’s
perception of the political system. As the accountability spectacle unfolds,
people make up their minds about politicians, institutions and ‘the system’
(cf. Christensen & Aars, 2019). Not having accountability rituals at all,
or being seen to obstruct them, renders them toothless. This will not
endear crisis leaders to citizens, particularly those groups who were put at
risk or suffered in the course of the crisis. More importantly, it will affect
democratic legitimacy. Hilliard et al. (2020) explain why:
Public demands to diagnose what went wrong and to hold those respon-
sible to account dominate public debates, constraining the range of policy
responses available to political elites. In theory, this process is crucial for the
restoration of trust between state and society. An over-emphasis on poli-
cies of accountability, however, makes negotiations among political parties
adversarial, confrontational, and often punitive, limiting the prospect of
harmonious decision making and precluding the consensus needed for
effective reform. In times of crisis, demagogues ride the tide of popular
discontent and hijack calls for accountability to play the blame game against
opponents, further trimming democratic legitimacy. (p. 14)
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Accountability is especially important in systems where it is not firmly
established or is being eroded. In systems where the executive has
involved a logic of ‘crisis government’ to ‘grab power’ on the wings
of the pandemic, crisis closure may not occur through due diligence in
performing accountability rituals. When leaders try to achieve closure
through issuing directives, telling their subjects that things have gone
back to normal while sweeping hard questions about their own conduct
under the carpet, trust in the accountability process will quickly erode (cf.
Edelman, 1971; Linz & Stepan, 1978; Rossiter, 1948).
Astute politicians understand the importance of performing account-
ability rituals. These rituals differ per society. In some accountability
forums, combative forms of engagement may be allowed or even
expected. In others, the script dictates respectful, deferential, open and
curious engagement with independent inquiries.
Some parliaments have either been semi-suspended or have decided to
give a wide berth to governments during the COVID-19 crisis, thereby
postponing the accountability work; others have been highly assertive and
have demanded ongoing engagement from government. For example, in
a discussion of the Czech Republic during the first phase of the epidemic,
Guasti (2020) observes that:
while the Czech government occasionally swerves towards illiberalism,
political opposition, media and courts provide an effective bulwark against
the rise of autocracy. Czech civil society, universities, and startups were able
to mitigate the scarcity of PPE effectively. Investigative journalists provided
information about gaps in the pandemic response. Political opposition
unified and held the government accountable. The parliament functions
as an effective check by rejecting the indefinite state of emergency. The
courts ensure that the pandemic response does not undermine democracy
and the rule of law. (p. 55)
In some other European countries, the rule of law and the fabric of moni-
tory democracy were not so resilient (Lührmann et al., 2020). Countries
where these violations have been most visible were the ones where democ-
racy had been ‘back sliding’ prior to the pandemic, notably Hungary
and Poland. Concerns about authoritarian ‘power grabs’ during the first
months of the pandemic ran so high that a group of 500 luminaries
including Nobel laureates, former heads of governments, judges and
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dozens of NGOs issued a collective ‘Call to defend democracy’. They
observed that:
Authoritarian regimes, not surprisingly, are using the crisis to silence critics
and tighten their political grip. But even some democratically elected
governments are fighting the pandemic by amassing emergency powers
that restrict human rights and enhance state surveillance without regard to
legal constraints, parliamentary oversight, or time frames for the restora-
tion of constitutional order. Parliaments are being sidelined, journalists are
being arrested and harassed, minorities are being scapegoated, and the
most vulnerable sectors of the population face alarming new dangers as
the economic lockdowns ravage the very fabric of societies everywhere.
(Call to Defend Democracy, 2020)
The Politics of Learning
Crises are great teachers for those who are willing to learn (Derwort et al.,
2018; Newig et al., 2019). They create opportunities for those who seek
to shatter bastions of convention (‘the way we do things around here’)
and open space for hitherto silenced voices, unpopular ideas, untried
policies and new institutions (Hay, 1996).
Research findings do not support the often-heard stereotype that
crisis inquiries are primarily symbolic ‘pressure valves’. In fact, post-crisis
inquiries appear to be quite effective mechanisms for learning about crises
(Stark, 2018, 2019). The 9/11 Commission’s final report, for instance,
proved catalytic for reform of the byzantine and distinctly un-collegiate
US intelligence community. Likewise, Mintrom et al. (2020) find that
Royal Commissions can have positive impacts if they succeed in careful
narrative framing, coalition-building and stress-testing to ensure their
recommendations are implementable.
This brings us to the challenge of recovery and renewal: how a society
can move on after crisis without suffering for a long time from its
legacy. The question is whether a society chooses to learn the lessons
that will help to move it forward in a stronger fashion. The pandemic
has revealed gaps in the resilience of healthcare and emergency manage-
ment systems. It has exposed the downsides of the ‘just-in-time’ and ‘as
cheap as possible’ logic of globalized supply chains for pharmaceutical
products and critical medical equipment. It exacerbated social disadvan-
tages by hitting hardest those already in the low-paid gig industry, the
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long-term unemployed, children locked in precarious family settings and
people experiencing disability or chronic health issues.
The pandemic also revealed the strengths of systems, organizations and
people, whether it be manufacturing corporations rapidly adjusting their
production to meet urgent needs for protective equipment, the remark-
able scale and pace of self-organizing community support for elderly
and vulnerable citizens, public agencies stepping up to work at break-
neck speed and in unusual unison, or governments willing to adopt a
bi-partisan and explicitly evidence-based approach to policymaking.
Virologists, epidemiologists and other medical specialists scrambled to
find out what they were dealing with, sharing emerging insights about the
virus, its impacts and treatment options at frenetic pace. Governments
and public health providers built capacities for testing, contact tracing
and running quarantines—none of which proceeded without high-profile
errors, which, in turn, became subjects of intense scrutiny, and consid-
erable real-time adaptation (Mazey & Richardson, 2020, p. 5). Schools,
hospitals, nursing homes, prisons, human services providers, retail stores,
internet providers, transport firms, the hospitality industry: all had to
adjust their operating models to lockdowns, border closures, infec-
tion clusters—and then to government support schemes and regulatory
interventions.
At the policy level, learning proved more challenging and contested.
Senior policymakers had to learn how their goals could best be met
and at what price. In some countries, swift changes to initial strategies
were adopted in the light of emerging data and feedback; in others,
policymakers persevered with their initial choice while resisting heavy
pressure to change tack. The contrasting cases of New Zealand (adho-
cratic policy learning on-the-hop) and Sweden (policy persistence despite
negative feedback and public controversy) provide textbook examples of
these different intracrisis learning dynamics (Stern, 2015). Both were
performed with conviction and flair, and seemed to resonate well with
majority public sentiments in the two countries, but neither proved
flawless or incontestable.
From the very beginning of the crisis, a rhetoric of learning emerged,
emphasizing the need to distil lessons. What those lessons ought to be is
of course anything but self-evident. Nor can it be taken for granted that
high-minded commitments to implement recommendations of inquiries
are matched by vigorous and sustained efforts to do so. Change may well
occur, but not necessarily as a product of learning (Schiffino et al., 2015).
5 TOWARDS CLOSURE 97
Reaching beyond the crisis response issues, governments at all levels,
international organizations, think tanks as well as advocates for innova-
tion and reform in various policy domains have already begun to stake
out the terrain and articulate their visions of recovery, proposing alter-
native futures (see, for instance, Dawson & McCalman, 2020). So have
‘pandemic populists’ of the far right, and conspiracy theorists who seek to
expose and crush the deep state, big tech and critics of liberal democracy
(Vieten, 2020).
What all such proponents of ‘recovery’ and ‘change’ have in common
is that they seek to exploit the surge in attention, the rattled mindsets,
the pent-up emotions, the policy vacuums, the political uncertainty and
the plentiful debates, to dramatize the need for their version of ‘change’.
COVID-19 appears to provide everyone with a chance to see what they
want to see, and to argue for policy shifts they had been advocating for
some time. Advocates for big government, for instance, point to the lack
of foresight in pandemic preparedness, which has forced governments into
reactive, improvisational fire-fighting:
Covid-19 might possibly turn out to have been a seismic event in the
process by which public policies are made. [It] has demonstrated beyond
doubt that when the going gets tough, the public relies on governments,
not markets, to come to the rescue… It has taken one virus to kill another.
Fiscal constraint, prudence, and ‘good housekeeping’ rules that since the
1980s framed and severely constrained debates about what is or is not
possible across almost every policy sector (and across national boundaries)
now look very outdated. (Mazey & Richardson, 2020, p. 8)
Some choose the language of evidence to remind their audiences of the
need for equity-enhancing policy shifts:
We know infectious diseases, like other health conditions, are highly influ-
enced by the social determinants of health. That is, the conditions in which
people live, learn and work, play a significant role in influencing their health
outcomes. Broadly speaking, the greater a person’s socioeconomic disad-
vantage, the poorer their health. In shining a light on these inequities the
pandemic also provides an opportunity for us to begin to address them,
which will have both short and longer term health benefits. (Vally, 2020)
But every push for crisis-induced ‘lesson-drawing’ that involves shaking
up entrenched institutions, and the beliefs and interests of the coalitions
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underpinning them, elicits a counter push. The defenders of the status
quo employ a version of what Hirschman (1991) called the rhetoric of
reaction: that the system really isn’t broken, that the proposed solutions
are futile or even worse than the maladies of the present order, that their
introduction will only create confusion and chaos.
Learning Barriers
It is difficult to learn in a well-considered and balanced way from crisis
episodes (cf. Bovens & ‘t Hart, 1996; Stern, 1999). First, the dominant
narrative about how the crisis came about may be skewed by hindsight
bias, or by an overemphasis on the choices and actions of a limited
number of individuals while ignoring broader structural factors, let alone
the role of contingency and chance (An & Tang, 2020). The diag-
nostic work of inquiries—often key drivers of generating lessons—may be
compromised by its members putting the pursuit of ‘pet theories’ above
careful consideration of all the evidence, as well as by the imposition of
strict deadlines, constrained mandates and paltry budgets (Boin, 2008;
Parker & Dekker, 2008).
Second, there is the ‘recency’ bias. The typical crisis-induced learning
effort adopts an N = 1 approach: deep immersion into the crisis of the
hour, more often than not at the expense of a comparative, longitudinal,
multi-N approach that provides a more robust and broader evidence base.
Crisis inquiries tend to entrench a single set of experiences packaged
into a single historical analogy. This can become so dominant within the
inquiry’s collective memory and mindset that it unwittingly gears itself up
to fight the last war—only the last war, and only a particular version of it.
Third, there is the political psychology of crisis learning, which tends
to skew receptivity towards the firm and the dramatic, and away from
the ambiguous and the subtle. Rocked by disturbing experiences, we
are motivated to learn more what feels good (and what satisfies our felt
need for decisive action) than what a more dispassionate analysis would
suggest makes the most sense. De Bruin and Van der Steen (2020, own
translation) put it aptly:
The deeper the crisis, the bigger the societal demand for unequivocal
accounts and lessons. When a crisis has produced massive damage and
much suffering, we generally become less interested in explanatory nuances
and prefer clarity above all. The more unambiguous the explanations, the
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more these can be peppered with terms such as ‘sharp’, ‘clear’, ‘tough’ and
‘rigorous’. The same goes for the lessons that are being put forward: things
need to become altogether and radically different. It is language that feels
good when we are rattled by a crisis. This results in a strange paradox: the
more complex and comprehensive a crisis has become, the greater the need
for competing perspectives on it, and yet at the same time the greater the
expected intolerance for such contestability and nuance in lesson-drawing.
(p. 12)
Fourth, implementing lessons may well entail the changing of beliefs,
structures, systems, staff, procedures or even cultures. None of that comes
cheap or easy; it is always risky. Organizations often prove much more
adept and willing to learn incremental, cheap and technical lessons. There
is less of an inclination to seek learning at the deeper and more strategic
level of the beliefs, values and cultures that underpin and sustain their
policies and practices.
Even when faced with damning inquiries and heavy pressure to prevent
repetition of a recent traumatic event, policymakers do not stop having to
make decisions under uncertainty, facing competing demands and limited
resources. Some of those decisions may work at cross-purposes of their
avowed commitment to ‘learn the lessons’ of the crisis. Lee et al. (2020)
offer a good example:
In 2005, BP experienced a major accident in its Texas City refinery that
killed 15 people. This was followed in 2006 by a five-day leak in the BP
pipeline that released the largest amount of oil in the history of Alaska.
In 2010, BP Deepwater Horizon exploded, killing 11 people and spilling
close to five million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. From each
accident, BP learned to improve safety, first in refining and then in pipeline
operations. However, the learning was myopic and confined to specific
divisions: refining and pipeline operations. BP did not [accept] that it had
a deeper problem with a culture that sacrificed safety for profit. By the
time BP confronted the Deepwater Horizon oil platform disaster, it was
too late. (p. 1037)
How contending diagnoses of past crises and visions for post-crisis futures
ultimately translate into institutional learning and purposeful change
varies markedly. Most research on the matter suggests we should expect
piecemeal rather than dramatic policy change (Boin et al., 2008; Keeler,
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1993). Even when crises hand rare windows of opportunity to advo-
cates of reform, they need to play their cards very carefully. They run
considerable political risk if they seek to capitalize on the momentum
(Berman, 2020; Boin et al., 2009; Goldfinch & ‘t Hart, 2003; Hogan &
Feeney, 2012; Keeler, 1993). Agile status-quo coalitions can manoeuvre
to neutralize crisis-driven reform agendas (Cortell & Peterson, 1999;
Nohrstedt & Weible, 2010; Pierson, 2005).
COVID’s Long Shadow and the Politics of Memory
The COVID-19 pandemic will cast a long shadow on hard-hit fami-
lies, communities, regions, professions, industries and nations. It will be
remembered as a marker of our times, perhaps as a symbol of our vulnera-
bility or indeed our resilience. People will develop rituals of remembrance
and mourning. The catastrophe will make its way into songs, poems,
novels, documentaries, history books, just as ‘1956’ did in Hungary
(Nyssönen, 1999), major floods did in Dutch cultural memory (Jensen,
2018), and Vietnam (Eyerman, 2019), Watergate (Schudson, 1993) and
‘9/11’ (Bond, 2015) did in the US.
While not necessarily overtly political in how these memories are
constituted and modified over time, these processes are deeply political
in their consequences. These memories affirm or criticize past choices,
and shape perceptions of crisis leaders and the institutions that imple-
mented their policies. They separate the good from the bad, suggesting
what communities, professions and politicians should do and not do in
regard to future crises. They determine not just what we remember, but
also what we choose to forget.
Stories about the pandemic’s occurrence will be told, retold and chal-
lenged. There will be stories about the hubris of our leaders ignoring
the warnings of experts (Snowden, 2020). Stories about the pandemic
as an inevitable by-product of the complex and tightly interconnected
systems that have been deeply integrated into our way of life, and the
cultural normalization of the risk of cascading failures that comes with it
(cf. Perrow, 1999; Tomaskovic-Devey, 2020). Stories that explain how
the pandemic and the responses to it ended up changing our soci-
eties profoundly—or not changing them in spite of all the damage and
suffering that was inflicted.
These and many other crisis stories will co-exist in collective memory.
They will be fought over. They will be resurrected, forgotten, twisted
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and turned, and selectively applied to interpret future epidemiological
challenges and the governance of health and disease. Historians, media,
history books, teachers, politicians, interest groups will accentuate some
version and background others. ‘Forgotten’ perspectives on the crises will
be unearthed and advocated. Like ‘Munich’ or ‘Swine Flu’, ‘COVID-19’
will become condensed and repackaged as a set of historical analogies that
will impinge themselves upon the sense-making and decision-making of
future policymakers and crisis responders (Beach et al., 2019; Brändström
et al., 2004; Khong, 1992; Neustadt & May, 1986).
Like the Holocaust, the Vietnam War, the life and death of Commu-
nism and 9/11, COVID-19 has turned big enough and bad enough for
its history to be written and rewritten, remembered and forgotten, lever-
aged and abused for a very long time (Eril, 2020). In that sense, the
politics of the pandemic and the crisis it created will not come to an end
any time soon.
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Abstract The COVID-19 crisis has tested public institutions, crisis lead-
ership and societal solidarity to the core. Fault lines have come to the
fore; unsuspected strengths have been noted. But will this be enough to
initiate the necessary steps to prepare our societies for the future crises
that will come? In this chapter, we offer the building blocks for an action
agenda. We identify various pathways to enhanced resilience.
Keywords COVID-19 · Resilience · Civic responsibility · Experts ·
Trust · Public bureaucracies · Political leadership · Future crises
Pivoting Forward
None of us imagined a year ago that we would be wrapping up a book
on a global pandemic that has dwarfed all other crises in living memory.
For professional observers of politics and government, the COVID-19
crisis has been nothing short of a breathtaking global field experiment
in societal resilience. It has shown how systems of government—institu-
tions, leaders, plans, policies, programmes and partnerships—performed
in the face of a very serious stress test. The crisis has prompted a
smorgasbord of questions, voluminous data and comparative puzzles for
political scientists, public administration scholars and students of crisis
management.
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As we write this, vaccinations are in full swing across the globe.
Hopefully, this will mark the beginning of the end of the pandemic.
But even in this phase, new critical governance challenges emerge with
regard to vaccine production, approval and distribution; the logistical
capacity of states to get vaccines into the arms of as many people as
quickly as possible; the selection of those who will get the vaccines first;
North-South solidarity in the purchasing and distribution of vaccines;
the prospect of reaching the high levels of participation in vaccination
programmes that are necessary to tame the virus; and the timing—and
international synchronization—of the lifting of national and subnational
border control, social distancing and lockdown measures.
After these challenges have been met and the immediate danger to
public health has faded, the governance of recovery and renewal will take
centre stage. A critical point of debate will be about direction: Are we
going to try and ‘bounce back’ or ‘pivot forward’ on the wings of what
COVID-19 has revealed about the vulnerability and resilience of our
economies, our communities and our public institutions? This, in turn,
gives rise to the question how the experiences of patients, families, corpo-
rations, schools, hospitals and governments will resonate in the public
policy choices that are to move societies beyond the pandemic.
We cannot second-guess these developments here. We will use this
final chapter to look forward in a different way. We view COVID-19 as
a harbinger of a new, global, even planetary, species of trouble the world
will face (Dror, 2014, 2017, 2020; Helsloot et al., 2012). We need to
prepare. Building on the experience of governing COVID-19 as described
in this book, we suggest five essential pathways for institutional learning
that governments may pursue in order to enhance governmental and soci-
etal resilience in the face of the mega-crises that await us (cf. Mazzucato
& Kattel, 2020).
Overcoming Organized Blindness
The COVID experience has highlighted what many risk and crisis
management experts have long understood: most public organizations
and indeed societies are not hardwired to look for, and appreciate,
bad-case scenarios. We should not be led astray by the contemporary
popularity of prospect theory—which tells us that once we frame issues
as being in the domain of loss, we are willing to go further and absorb
more risk in tackling them (Vis, 2011). The prospect of loss, even minimal
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loss, has done little to propel a drive towards preparedness. The incuba-
tion period of this pandemic illustrates that we face a serious challenge:
public organizations must develop the propensity and capacity to scan
their environment with a crisis antenna.
The COVID experience demonstrated that in many countries politi-
cians, public health bureaucrats, virologists and emergency planners alike
were unconsciously invested in not-seeing, not-grasping, not-framing the
signals of something enormously bad developing outside their borders.
This ‘organised blindness’ came in many different forms. Reassuring,
but misleading historical analogies suggested that an outbreak would be
geographically contained, or at least less impactful than it was in other
countries. Scarce attention easily shifted to other, less opaque, more polit-
ically pressing issues of the day. The virus was viewed a bit like climate
change: potentially very bad, but taking its time before it would be really
upon us. Nobody wanted to be the boy who cried wolf.
The drivers of organized blindness are well known (Kam, 1988; Turner
& Pidgeon, 1997). Failures of imagination. Disjointed systems that make
it hard to connect the dots. The dilemma of dealing with the low-
probability, high-impact contingency (Why spend capital on something
that is very unlikely to materialize?). The illusion of control, perpetuated
by fantasy documents that don’t ask the hard ‘what-if’ questions. The
propensity to stick to familiar ground—the ‘known-knowns’ in the risk
catalogue—in crisis planning. The tradition to ‘go soft’ on the partici-
pants of crisis exercises. The language of reassurance crafted for publics
that do not like to get upset.
Though these mechanisms have been well understood for some time,
they have nevertheless undermined our alertness to pandemic risk. They
have caused many governments to lose precious time to heighten public
awareness. They hindered mitigation efforts in the most vulnerable
sectors of society and undermined the preparation of systems for public
health, aged care and emergency management. They have left societies
unprepared for the unprecedented crisis that was on its way.
We must do better. We must get better at spotting looming trouble
earlier, and responding to it more quickly and smartly than most govern-
ments have done in relation to the Corona pandemic. We have succeeded
in domains such as mass transit systems, power grids, petrochemical and
nuclear industries, civil aviation and food safety. Driven by a deep aware-
ness that if mistakes are made, lots of people die, business models collapse,
and institutional reputations are badly affected, regulatory regimes and
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cultural practices have evolved in those sectors. They now routinely
deliver steady, nearly error-free performance under even the most chal-
lenging conditions (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).
In those ‘high reliability’ domains, professionals, managers and policy-
makers alike adhere to norms and practices of ‘wariness’ in monitoring
what is or might be happening in systems deemed to be high-risk (Chris-
tianson et al., 2011; Maitlis & Soneshein, 2010). What this means in
practice is that the usual risk management premises are reversed: stake-
holders are socialized into worrying about the potential impact of even
seemingly small incidents rather than worrying about the potential stigma
attached to devoting scarce resources to a low-probability problem.
The institutional learning challenge of moving from a propensity for
blindness to a state of permanent wariness begins with the punctua-
tion of deep-seated illusions of safety and security. We must open up to
the discomfort of knowing that we are more vulnerable than we like to
acknowledge. Political leaders must be willing to disappoint people and
teach them to stare vulnerability in the face and take personal ownership
of the risks they run (Heifetz, 1994). They must understand and explain
the paradox that the very way in which we have organized successful
economies and engaging lifestyles increases our exposure to existential
risk (Perrow, 2011). None of this is going to be easy. All of it is deeply
political in its implications. But what choice do we have?
Vigilant Decision-Making
In this crisis, as in most crises, governments had to make stark choices
under high levels of uncertainty. The uncertainty lasted a very long
time. Political leaders dealt with uncertainty in different ways. While we
await systematic evaluation of those decisions, we can offer some early
insights. Transboundary threats are not to be navigated on the basis of
gut instinct, standard operating procedures, personal caprice, or interest-
group lobbying. Precisely because crises can surprise us and shatter our
imagined certainties, we need the political responses to them to be both
informed and constrained by the best available evidence we can muster
under the circumstances. Flying by the seat of one’s pants is the inferior
option (Janis, 1989).
That said, the crisis also revealed the inherent complexity of a ‘listen
to the experts first’ strategy. Which experts are governments to listen
to? What if those experts disagree? And what if some experts become
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such revered figures that their authority outstrips the public credibility
of the responsible office-holders? In some countries, too much deference
may have been paid to all too narrowly organized expertise. It is not
a good idea to provide a particular epidemiologist or group of medical
experts privileged, even monopolistic, access to decision-makers. In some
countries, this pattern persisted even when their views and claims were
contested by their peers. Nor is it a good idea to rely exclusively on
medical expertise to deal with a multifaceted societal crisis.
It easily gets cosy when key decision-makers rely on liked and trusted
expert advisers. The effects can be severe. Some perspectives quickly earn
prominence, others never get a hearing. Dissent is dampened. Empathy
with the burden of responsibility faced by the politicians may begin to
influence the advice that is dispensed, at the expense of professional stew-
ardship and robust deliberation. In other words, we must learn to identify
what we might call organized tunnel vision: structures of expertise and
advice that take hold during the early stages of a crisis and remain in
place regardless of the shifting nature of the challenges policymakers face
as the crisis evolves.
Tackling complex and evolving crises requires organizing and weighing
evidence from a broad swath of disciplines and professions. Much of
this expertise is not by definition found in formal crisis advisory bodies.
COVID-19 reminds us that the most challenging crises are those that
traverse professional bodies of expertise.
The COVID-19 crisis teaches us that expertise matters. It also teaches
us that this expertise has to be actively managed and adapted as the crisis
evolves. In terms of institutional design, governments would do well to
create a series of multi-disciplinary webs and networks of expertise, each
primed to be mobilized in relation to key threats in their risk catalogues.
In terms of process management, there should be dedicated knowledge
brokerage capacity, organized right at the edge of the most senior crisis
decision-making bodies. There is a need for ‘chief advisory officers’—
people whose job it is to exercise stewardship over the quality of the
advisory process. To do this job, they need a licence to monitor and
manage the composition of the expertise that is made available to crisis
leaders, the rules of engagement between experts and policymakers, and
the relational climate that develops between them.
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Managing Fragmentation
One of the most challenging aspects of forging effective responses to
large-scale emergencies is to overcome the stymying effects of entrenched
professional, jurisdictional and sectoral boundaries and mindsets. Profes-
sions and organizations have strong views about ‘the way we do things
around here’. When finding themselves in a situation of having to align
their actions to those of other organizations in order to forge holistic
responses, they may not be immediately inclined to give up their cher-
ished practices, the beliefs and assumptions upon which these practices
rest, and the social identities they confer.
The compartmentalization of authority, budgets and other resources
that sustains bureaucratic silos is driven by formalized responsibilities.
Public officials tend to serve political office-holders who are held to
account for things that happen (and do not happen) in their assigned
playing field only. Agencies may be more interested in hugging (or
avoiding) the spotlight and in protecting their ‘turf’ than pooling
resources and surrendering their autonomy for the benefit of joined-
up crisis responses (Rosenthal et al., 1991; Wilson, 1989). Moreover,
organizational behaviours and interorganizational relationships are path-
dependent: agencies, sectors and jurisdictions—including nation states
and international organizations—that routinely squabble over mandates,
money, policy priorities and political differences are not likely to suddenly
trust each another when a crisis appears on the horizon.
Both the potential and the fragility of interorganizational and inter-
jurisdictional coordination in crisis response and recovery operations
have been well-documented (Dynes, 1970; Rosenthal et al., 1991).
The COVID-19 crisis has merely confirmed these research findings
(Alemanno, 2020; Arias et al., 2020; Hattke & Martin, 2020; Zao &
Wu, 2020).
The COVID experience is a stark reminder that there are strong
drivers of persistent fragmentation even when there is a great functional
need for integration. Overcoming fragmentation in how we organize and
coordinate crisis responses across boundaries is both an urgent neces-
sity and a formidable institutional learning endeavour (Pacces & Weimer,
2020). Acknowledgement of these realities is crucial. Laissez-faire is not
an option.
It starts with accepting that the contingencies we face are so big,
complex, intertwined and urgent that to ‘go at them alone’ is not just
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predictably ineffective but foolishly reckless. To overcome all the formal
and informal incentives that point in the opposite direction will require
wisdom, humility, strength of purpose and tenacity in public leadership.
Former top Australian public servant Peter Shergold (2008) captures
poignantly what is needed: “[it] requires public servants who, with eyes
wide open, can exert the qualities of leadership necessary to forsake the
simplicity of control for the complexity of influence… [T]hey need to
operate outside the traditionally narrow framework of government, which
they have for so long worked within” (p. 21).
But strengthening centripetal behaviour will require more than an
organized epiphany. We also need to consider how to overcome existing
institutional disincentives. In the absence of a winning formula, this will
require a strategy of experimentation with other institutional mecha-
nisms. Some may argue for the appointment of national and transnational
coordinators: honest brokers imbued with soft power—the power to
persuade, convene and shame—needed to seduce key stakeholders inside
and outside government to come out of their rabbit holes and embrace
interdependence. Others will argue that nothing short of far-reaching
centralization of power, authority and accountability will do if we are
serious about building the governance capacity required to deal with the
most extreme form of transboundary crisis: planetary emergencies (e.g.
Dror, 2014, 2017).
Perhaps the least controversial, no-regret option is to build integrated
crisis management from the ground up by investing in boundary-
spanning administrative capacity and planning repertoires. Low-politics,
backstage platforms upon which epistemic expert communities can
flourish. These platforms exist to stimulate joint fact-finding, joint devel-
opment of risk catalogues and scenario planning, joint exercises, joint
formulation and harmonization of standards. These bridging mechanisms
help to fill the institutional void that exists in the spaces between juris-
dictions, sectors and professions. None of this is heroic, nor is it likely
to produce swift results. It is grinding work, but it is the first step in
designing joined-up crisis management capacity (e.g. Ansell et al., 2010;
Boin et al., 2013; Blondin & Boin, 2020).
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Credible Crisis Narratives
Together with other recent crises, the COVID experience has demon-
strated just how precarious the contemporary communications environ-
ment has become for policymakers. There is a perennial concern about
misinformation. There are recurrent claims and complaints about trans-
parency, cover-ups and conspiracies. There are painful contrasts between
upbeat governmental rhetoric about harmony, solidarity and consensus
about ‘fighting a common enemy’ and the observable realities of non-
compliance and widespread dissent. As the crisis divides the public,
dominating contentious ‘framing contests’ soon proves elusive.
And yet, some leaders and governments did an admirable job of
making their narratives dominate for an extended period of time. What
seemed to be a common thread between those relatively successful
meaning-making performances was a sense of directness and realism,
authenticity and consistency in the deliverance of official messages
(Ardern, Merkel and Trudeau come to mind). No sugar-coating the
nature of the threat. No upholding of the illusion that the govern-
ment was—or even could be—‘in control’ while the house was so
evidently burning. No hiding of the dilemmas policymakers faced, or
of the emotions the crisis invoked in them, too. No paternalistic fear of
panicking citizens, but mature engagement with them. Not walking away
from errors and misjudgements but owning up to them. Not assuming
the nation will get a particular message simply because the head of
government has included it in a press conference.
The key building blocks for credible strategic crisis communication are
well known (cf. Frandsen & Johansen, 2020). There is no rocket science
involved, but it always proves extremely hard to make such a strategy
work: aligning the will, the abilities, and the discipline among heads
of government and ministers, their minders, the subject matter experts,
the communication specialists, the information flows between policy
and operations. Given the fragmented, high-speed, politicized nature of
today’s communications environment, we should not have inflated expec-
tations about the level of narrative dominance that any single actor can
be expected to obtain. But we must try. In a crisis, fragmentation of
narratives can quickly undermine the legitimacy of a national response.
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Managing Collective Stress
From a governance point of view, navigating crises is not just about
dealing with physical destruction, lives endangered or uprooted, and
financial costs incurred. It is also about attending to the collective stress
that a crisis causes. This brings us into the domain of social and political
psychology.
The levels, distribution and expressions of collective stress triggered
by crises are highly unpredictable. Who could have foreseen the massive
outpouring of grief, sympathy and, eventually, indignation by the British
public in the wake of Lady Diana’s death? Was this the same nation that
had stoically ‘kept calm and carried on’ during the devastating Battle
of Britain? Who would have thought that in the midst of a deadly
pandemic, a large group of Americans would storm the Capitol because
their candidate had lost the election?
Clearly, the material and psychological realities of crises are not self-
evidently intertwined, and may, in fact, be uncoupled. It is hard to
predict how a crisis activates people’s levels of fear, anger, disappoint-
ment, hope, confidence, patience, capacity to forgive and inclination to
get on with their lives. We know this much: collective stress can remain
pent-up in crisis-affected communities long after the material dislocation
has occurred—even long after the material recovery. Some crises cast very
long shadows, enduring years or even decades. They fester because rituals
of closure have not been performed. Botched investigations, railroaded
accountability, scapegoating and empty rhetoric of reform, injustices left
unaddressed, organized forgetting—these are the factors that feed societal
resentment.
Leaders and institutions may, for valid or not so valid reasons, be keen
to ‘move on’, to turn the page and put the crisis into the past. Emotion-
ally aroused citizens and stakeholders may not allow them to do so. In
contemporary, ‘monitorial’ democracies, disgruntled citizens have ample
avenues to make themselves heard (Keane, 2018). The resultant politics
of investigation, accountability, liability, blame and compensation typically
produce more losers than winners.
To avoid such messy endings, leaders and institutions must learn to
recognize, respect and address collective stress. It is not an ephemeral by-
product of material discomfort or momentary shock and fear. Collective
stress is the thermostat of a crisis. When left unaddressed, it fuels the
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public discontent and contestation that drive the escalation towards a full-
blown political or institutional crisis.
Governments should get better at the relational work of listening to
the voices of those most affected by a crisis. They should not wait until
response operations have ceased, but use these voices as data in targeting
and adjusting their response efforts. They should aim to create rapid social
feedback cycles. Governments should also keep in view that in times of
crises the ‘how’ of government action remains as important to citizens
as the ‘what’. Governments should not cut corners on procedural fair-
ness, transparency, the rule of law and other essential public values to ‘do
what it takes’ in the face of crisis. Going praeter et contra legem invites
critical scrutiny that may compromise support for everything else that
governments are trying to do in response to the crisis.
Finally, in their desire to close the book on a post-acute crisis and
nudge the community to move on from it, governments should avoid
some predictable mistakes. Promising too much or declaring victory too
soon. Attempting to curtail investigations. Refusing to stage or participate
in rituals of mourning, solidarity and remembrance. The enormity of the
hurt and loss needs to be acknowledged, again and again. It is only by
not walking away from the collective stress and by realizing that it is not
‘over until it is over’ that governments truly exercise their duty of care
and create conditions for wounds to be healed.
What Matters Now
COVID-19 has demonstrated that come the arrival of a transboundary
crisis of mega proportions, good governance—buffeted by social trust,
civic responsibility and astute leadership—makes a real difference in
forging effective and legitimate responses. The underlying conditions of
good crisis governance can help societies meet future crises. We end
this book by listing the conditions that matter for the development of
administrative, institutional and societal resilience.
Trust matters. When the chips are down, an effective crisis response
may well hinge on citizens complying with new rules of appropriate
behaviours. Erosion of citizen trust in politics and political processes
has been a societal feature from the 1960s onwards and escalating since
the turn of the millennium. Perhaps it matters less in ‘normal’ times
when political systems can continue to function with containable levels
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of distrust. It matters ‘big time’ when there is a whole-of-society threat
and a dire need for temporary adherence to new rules and new norms.
Civic responsibility matters. One can easily bemoan the decline of commu-
nity bonds and civic virtues or explain these trends as the product of
new technologies, changing demographics, evolving labour markets and
so on. Nevertheless, civic responsibility matters when government crisis
policies are predicated on societal-wide behavioural change that requires
strong doses of altruism. If societies are to develop long-term capacities
for resilience in face of the next mega-crisis, then cultivating a sense of
civic duty is essential.
Science matters. There is no such thing as a universally agreed, unam-
biguous and cohesive body of knowledge that provides a combination
of effective and feasible crisis solutions. Still, the sciences—from public
health and biology to economics, law and psychology—matter greatly
when complex, inter-woven threats emerge and the best we can do is
gather scarce data in real time and use our expertise to sift through and
gauge it before offering advice to decision-makers. In a crisis, we will
always need intuition, hunches and good judgement, but this does not
mean we should jettison and vilify ‘science’. Respect for expertise (and
we should be critical and probing when we need to be) is essential for
dealing with future crises.
Public bureaucracies matter. Mega-crises require massive engagement of
the private sector, non-governmental organizations, political parties and
ordinary citizens. But the public bureaucracy remains pivotal for orches-
trating an effective and legitimate crisis response and recovery strategies.
Only public institutions have the legal and political authority, as well as
the financial resources and the capacity to direct a societal response—
especially if it means shutting down large sectors of market activities
and business operation. We cannot expect future crises to be managed
without deeply embedding crisis resilience and vigilance in the structures,
processes and culture of our public institutions.
Leadership matters. If we want to be prepared for whatever crises lurk
around the corner, from superbugs to climate change, the quality of crisis
leadership is crucial. Effective crisis leadership isn’t a top-down exercise. It
must remain constrained by democratic checks and balances, particularly
so when executive powers are being expanded to meet threats that are
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deemed to be extraordinary. The work of public leadership in crises is to
ensure that governments not only strive to do ‘what works’ but always
consider the social and political legitimacy of their actions.
Political choices matter. Ultimately, societies have to make political choices
about the envisioned state of resilience and the price that will be paid
to accomplish it. These choices are constrained by all manner of path
dependencies and political powers, but they are choices nevertheless. Do
we want to follow the usual rituals of post-crisis learning where we end up
with packages of ring-fenced reform that lead us straight back to the ‘pre-
crisis normal’? Or do we recognize that our systems of public governance
have been closer to breaking point than we could ever have imagined,
and that we should seriously consider the case for reinvigorating public
sector governance capacity—not as a symbolic reflex but for the sake of
enhancing resilience?
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